THE IRANŪN AND PHILIPPINES' HISTORICAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The binding tie of place, meaning, and memory

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Version: 08.00
September 29, 2023

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To the architects of the Batalo-Pagilidan
Without whose protective shell
We would not have lived
To tell the tale

Author's note

Up until three months ago, it never quite entered my mind to write anything about Sulawan or the Spratly islands as the world had came to know it in the modern era. It is not that I do not have ample material to go by. I am, in fact, hoarding a lot of indigenous materials of my folks in the Southern Philippines, determined to write what I envision is a grand opus seven-volume series on the *Monsoon Riders: The Iranūn of Southeast Asia*. However, I got so immersed in my writing and field works that I could "not see the trees for the forest" or rather, I became so detached from current affairs until His Highness, Sultan Tomas Reyes Cabili, Jr. became curious about my present preoccupation. When I told him that I am researching about the history of the Iranūn, he asked if the Iranūn has remotely anything to do with the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Even as I was forming my answer, my mind was already racing into the deep recesses of my research. As happens, asking the right question teases out snippets of *eureka* moment in an otherwise mundane undertaking.

The Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal issue is punching into the headlines with ever increasing frequency, and as I perused Filipino written materials on the disputes, nothing dealt with any Filipino historical claims on the South China Sea. Perhaps, this spurred China to foist its mythical "2,000 years of sovereign historical rights" over the islands in the South China Sea as "part of the holy motherland". On my part, despite the time constraint I was able to put up what I hope is a water-tight monograph in record time.

Thanks to the references and materials we have patiently accumulated over the decades at the *PMTC Institute of Iranūn Studies*, I have little trouble sewing up the narratives. Dr. Norma M. Sharief, the Chair of the Institute, has the vision of reviving and rehabilitating the Iranūn in the 21st century just like what Europe did in repackaging the Vikings. Also, Dr. Noralin Sharief-Ador, the President of the Philippines Muslim Teachers College based in Marawi has been constantly guiding our works and movement over the years.

I want to thank also my president at the Southeast Asian Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Amanoding D. Esmail for providing the trade aspects of our advocacy. Lastly, I am grateful to the Tomas Ll. Cabili Foundation for championing our historical claims in the South China Sea. The three organizations had a clockwork coordination in launching last July 19, 2023 *Declaration of Provenance of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal by the Descendants of the Ḍaì sa Condor* باءِ ساكوندور *and Anta sa Têbouk*.

INTRODUCTION:
GOING BEYOND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORKS

This is an advance schrift on the author's upcoming book: *The Iranūn and Philippines' Historical Claims in the South China Sea: The binding tie of place, meaning and memory*. Our noble purpose here is to provide the Philippines a timely 'ammunition' on the sovereign claim of the Philippines over the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal that have never been brought to the argumentation. So far no claimant country has provided convincing explanation — let alone a cohesive narrative — for a historical stake on the disputed islands. China, Vietnam and Taiwan espoused historical arguments to legitimize their claims. The rest choose to be silent on this aspect. Apparently since countries like the Philippines have been generally mum on the historical claim, China view this as a weakness, and keeps reiterating its so-called 'sovereign historical' right, even while all along has been purposely vague on its Nine-dashed Line. Chinese writers also wantonly press on with the 'sovereign' right while the Philippines sidesteps and presses instead with the theoretical frameworks as defined by the UNCLOS. Thus, the need arises to lend the historical narrative on our claim to solidify the Philippines' position on the South China Sea dispute. In so doing, while we call China at their bluff, we are also revealing historical details of our country that have, heretofore, been absent in our school textbooks as, though Dr. José Rizal had paid obeisance to "the indomitable sons of the South", Philippine history, never mind Southeast Asian history, has never been kind to the Iranūn people.

Now our undoing haunts us. As it stands now, Philippine history is being decoded according to the precepts of the legacies of our colonial experience, that, to paraphrase Jacob van Leur, it is being written from the deck of a Galleon ship. And no one is the wiser.

China is just all too happy that we embrace this. Our institutions, over the century, have accumulated piles and piles of academic papers, researches, and anthropological studies that is rendered useless and irrelevant against the onslaught of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The Chinese gloats in our quandary. "The Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands stayed beyond the attention of the Spanish colonial empire," wrote Xu Xiaodong in *China Daily*. He further declares that "…a review of history shows that the Philippines has no historical basis for its claim to the Spratly Islands…"

China has decided that historical basis is the Achilles' heel of Philippines' claim on the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal. That is why they keep pummeling on it as a battering

ram to undo whatever pyrrhic victory had been gained at the United Nations. They sense that we are wanting in this sphere that we solely dwell on the scaffolds of the UNCLOS (United Nations Conventions on the Sea) and run like a child hiding behind the skirt of an adult. Now we have the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the South China Sea to point out whenever China tries to bully us, but it brought us no farther than that.

China tries to prod us out of our cocoon, beckoning us to a one-on-one "dialogue" sans the uncles and the aunts. China is so confident that the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoals has been part of its "holy motherland" for '2,000-years'. Highfalutin as the wording is, China is dead-serious about its historical claim, and unlike the PCA Arbitration award, it enforces it with vigor as it had virtually stopped all oil and gas drilling off the coasts of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines on the grounds that such activities violate her *historic* rights.

Can we dispute China on their so-called '2,000-year' historical claim? Should we be tempted to a parley with them for the sake of what they term as an 'amicable settlement'? Or should we just stay put on our current stance sink or swim?

We are confident that without abandoning the decisions of the arbitration and the pronouncements of UNCLOS of which China is a signatory, we can lay down our historical claim which is even more potent than other claimant countries, including China, as encapsulated in this monograph we prepared.

This work fills in an overdue need to come up with a historical narrative of our claims in the South China Sea. When you browse Filipino articles on the South China Sea, there is so much left to be desired. Antonio Carpio's compiled lectures on the South China Sea dispute held 243-pages (*The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea*, 2017). When you look at the contents, it virtually has no account on how Filipinos themselves might have explored the South China Sea and the coastal polities that ringed it and traversed and used the Spratleys and the adjacent islets for their own purposes in the past. The intro chapter opens with a discussion on the Austronesian migration, then a vague narrative on the Champā Sea and the islands called "Pulo", before it segued on the Majapahit Empire and abruptly terminating on the voyages of Admiral Zang He. All in all, Carpio spent only a total 17 pages that deals with vague generalities of other people's exploits, never mind a Filipino experience.

No doubt, Carpio merely uses the chapter as a perfunctory launching pad to pave the way for an engaging discussion on the theoretical controversy and dispute on the South China Sea which by the way he adumbrated splendidly in the chapters that followed. This formed the bulkhead of the e-book. Carpio, in one of the chapters, did devote a hefty 38-

page discussion on historic rights claim, but again it is not about the Philippines' historic claim; it is about countering China's.

While the Philippines had done well on its technical homework on the Spratlys, it is in the core area of 'historical' claim that China has been smug about (not that the UNCLOS recognize historical claims). Perhaps Chinese researchers had decided that the Philippines' weakness lies in the historical narrative, so they did not deign to participate in the arbitrations, knowing they would lose on all counts. This attitude became clear when after the international tribunal had ruled in favor of the Philippines on Jul 12, 2016, the Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin in an official briefing at the State Council Information Office, denounced the ruling, personally attacking the judges, questioning whether they knew anything about Asia or the history of the South China Sea.

It is the Chinese presumption that backed by a millennium's worth of writing tradition, they could trump up anybody in terms of history on the South China Sea. After all most histories of Southeast Asian polities were, in one way or another, informed by Chinese chronicles. Having this "moral ascendancy", they feel they could play fast and loose with other nation-states. It is this kind of posturing that led the Chinese to believe that they can plant their own 'evidences' at will and tamper with history. Whether surreptitiously smuggling artifacts into the heart of the South China Sea and allow them to thaw unnoticed and later uncork them to an unsuspecting audience, or whether squeezing out twisted interpretations on ancient Chinese chronicles, the Chinese of today is doing a disservice to its long tradition that the world has, otherwise, come to admire.

CONTENTS

Author's note i

Introduction: Going beyond theoritical frameworks ii

Chapter 1 Danger on the seas: a rocky background 1

No terra nullius 3

Chapter 2 Traditional routes: Cheng He's flat-bottomed expeditions 7

Chapter 3 Unfreezing borders: Reopening Old wounds 14

The beginnings of Champā and the routes less travelled is the oldest 15

Chapter 4 *Carta Indigena Filipina*: the unknown Iranūn Portulan 20

Differences between the Moro-Iranūn portulan at Madrid and the Bugis portulan at Utrecht 25

A precious relationship: Dynamics of the Iranūn-Bugis tandem in Southeast Asia 28

Other Iranūn maps in existence 30

Chapter 5 The Special Case of Panakot (Scarborough Shoal) 32

History Deception 101: Manufacturing seeds of endearment 35

China discovered Panakot before the Filipinos could do themselves 37

Guo Shoujing surveyed Scarborough Shoal for the Chinese 37

Fishing is a state act 39

Chapter 6 Ḅai sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور (Côn Sơn): Historical disconnect of the nine dashed-line 40

The Two Houses of Tebouk تُبوك and Pandara....49

Chapter 7 Đại Việt and Champā's Centuries of Wars 57

Chapter 8 Influences and Iranūn trail in Siam and Cambodia....67

Chapter 9 Cambodia asked Magindanao's help; Iberians' attempt to gain foothold in mainland Southeast Asia....75

Coming to a head....77

Chapter 10 Iranūn's steerage of Cham refugees....80

Adrift in a déjà vu: the 'boat people'....80

The Singhapala Bisayans from Vijaya....82

Palawan فَلَوَن as transit hub for immigrants....89

Chapter 11 Summary....91

APPENDIX....97

Questions and Answers....97

Declaration of Provenance of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal....102

Bullet Points for Presentation....104

TABLE OF CHARTS, MAPS AND FIGURES

Figure 1: President Elpidio Quirino and Senator Tomas Ll. Cabili (in full regalia) watching a cultural presentation at the latter's bestowal as Sultan a Dimasángkay ko Ranao....6
Figure 2: The simplest east-west route of the China trade. 8
Figure 3: Mongol-Yuan expedition (1293) and Zheng He's voyages (1405-1433)....10
Figure 4: The earliest route taken by the Austronesian to mainland Southeast Asia was unorthodox. 16
Figure 5. 18th century Moro-Iranūn portulan (Museo Naval, Madrid). Photo Courtesy of Jean Paul Potet, made available to the author especially for this publication. 21
Figure 6: A 19th century contiguous Iranūn kirim script more than 4-meter long preserved in a bamboo canister like the Carta Indigena Filipina. 24
Figure 7: Boeginese zeekaart van de Indische Archipel (ca. 1820) at Universiteitsbibliotheek Utrecht, Netherlands. 27
Figure 8: Replica of a page of 'Tuhfat al-Nafis'. 29
Figure 9: Actual photo of Panacot, now called Scarborough Shoal. 32
Figure 10: The Panacot as drawn in the 1734 Velarde map....33
Figure 11: Ancient Butuan boat at the National Museum of the Philippines. (Photo: NMP Manila). 34
Figure 12: A historical disconnect of the Nine-Dashed Line. The area in transparent green are connected by a Southeast Asian network in history....41
Figure 13. Pulo Condor as shown in the Abraham Ortelius map, 1570....42
Figure 14: Descripcion De Las Yndias Ocidentales by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Madrid/1601 (1726)....46
Figure 15: The banderole in the Murillo Velarde map attesting to the independence of the "Moro" Sultanates....48
Figure 16: Ancestry of the Mabay sa Condor. 49
Figure 17: The House of Amatunding a Nuni and ancestry 50
Figure 18: A sample page from a kirim script. 51
Figure 19: The 10-Generation descent of Sultan Tomas Ll. Cabili from the Ḅai sa Condor. 56
Figure 20: Trade route via the unorthodox route of the Iranūn....61

Figure 21: A late 19th Century Iranūn warship built for speed, maneuverability, and efficiency.....63
Figure 22: How the house of the Iranūn, Magindanao and Sulog سولُغ is descended from the nobility of Champā. 65
Figure 23.One could easily mistook this old lady as a 'Babo' in Maranao, a Magindanao or a Sulog. 69
Figure 24: The Trà Kiệu formerly called Simhapura (Lion Citadel) is a toponym of the old capital of Cebu in Central Visayas, Philippines. 84
Figure 25: The two routes taken by the Chams refugees, five hundred years apart.....85

Minsan oray bolawan ī oran sa di ta ingĕd, na mapagiroy taděman so tarintik sa ňgġanatan.

Howbeit it showers gold in distant shores, still one yearns for the drizzle in one's sod.

— Iranūn proverb

As a historian, I have learned that, in fact, not everyone who reaches back into history can survive it. And it is not only reaching back that endangers us; sometimes history itself reaches inexorably forward for us with its shadowy claws.

— Elizabeth Kostova

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CHAPTER 1 DANGER ON THE SEAS: A ROCKY BACKGROUND

If the reputation of the Asian seas as portrayed by early 9th century geographers as an exoticized realm of monsters and other enticements is to find purchase in the traveler's mind, it is the existence of the danger area around Spratly Islands and the Paracel with its attendant volatile weather that gave it the said reputation. These colorful tales may have been promoted by writers from the 10th to the 14th centuries like Masudi, Idrisi, and Ibn Khaldun to enable Arab monopoly on navigations in this part of the world and who thought it better to keep the Europeans bottled up in the dark for as long as possible, enabling these traders to continue indefinite control of the maritime silk route undisturbed, and thus the monopoly of the spice trade to Europe.[1]

For a millennium or so until the second half of the 20th century, the reefs, sandbanks, and shoals in the central South China Sea is a non-issue for the ancient polities of Asia. Not that China, as it now claims, has an inviolable right over them as part of the "holy motherland" for a stretch of "2,000-years". The truth is, no country — including China itself— would be bothered about a desperate spikes of protruding skerries randomly strewn on the sea. In a period when land was plentiful, when whole continents were being gifted for a pittance, who would bother about islets that play peekaboo on unwary mariners who happen to lost their bearing? Even as late as the 17th century, the newly discovered Selden Map clearly favors the western coast-hugging route that passes round Champā (now Vietnam) and the eastern coast-hugging passage that hugs along the coast of Kapulōän (now Palawan فَلَوَن). This shows that mariners gingerly skirt round the expanse of the South China Sea, giving it a wide berth lest

[1] Spate, Oskar Herman Khrisitian, *The Spanish Lake* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 10.

their boats get caught among the shark-toothed rocks. The European names associated with the modern names of the islands are a testament to the danger of the area to commercial shipping. The Scarborough Shoal was named after a ship of the East India Company that grounded on one of the rocks in 1784, although it already had a native name recorded in the 1734 Velarde map of Spanish Philippines, as if ownership could be established by sheer baptismal.

Yet it was these very 'obstacles' that had been leveraged by Austronesians in their long distance travels. They utilized these scattered pebbles of islands to hopscotch their way to mainland Asia and reach the far-flung islands of the Pacific. One of these peoples were the redoubtable Iranūn romanticized later by historians as the 'Viking of the Eastern Seas'.[2]

From the early times, the Iranūn were unmatched in riding the monsoons, the seasonal winds that pulled across the continent during the hot months of the Central Asian summer and pushed away during the cold Central Asian winter. This basic rhythm of the Central Asian bellows offered an opportunity that seaborne sojourners of Southeast Asia seized. They sailed thousands of miles from their homes, navigating by means of swell and wave patterns, cloud formations, winds, birds, and whiff of sea life. Through an astronomical configuration known as *kapamitoon*, the Iranūn had mapped the celestial bodies to guide them in their navigation. Experienced pilots relied on their prodigious memories of tides and currents, landmarks, ports, and the hidden enclaves as emergency resort in case of storms or a need to elude pursuers. This sophisticated and complex knowledge was passed on from generation to generation. It is this set skill that they had put to deadly use to resist subjugation by the colonialists.

Things have changed though. Today, the South China Sea, a 3,000,000-square-kilometer semi-enclosed sea, is traversed by half the world's supertankers. Today, it is said that Spratly lie atop a potential yield in excess of a billion barrels of oil and untold quantities of natural gas. At once, these desperate reefs became the most sought-after spot in Asia. Just who could have been traversing and using these 'wretched' islets when everyone else was loath to go near it?

The Philippines had sensed early the trouble brewing on the horizon. Around the middle of the 20th century, the program to safeguard the outlying possession of the Philippines had started earnestly as soon as the Philippines had divested itself off the

[2] Owen Ruttger, Pirate Wind, Tales of the Sea-Robbers of Malaya (London: Hutchinsons & Co, Ltd., 1930), 19.

clutches of colonial powers. It started retracing its boundaries according to the provenance of our ancestors, beyond the drawing board of the colonialists.

No terra nullius

In 1956 Tomas Arbolente Cloma rediscovered our ancestors' watering hole of Spratly Islands and took possession of them. In 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos — an astute student of history — made it a municipality of Palawan فَلَوَن named "Kalayaan" under the custody of the Department of National Defense. A battalion of Marines was stationed there, a 1.3 km-runway constructed, and a population of 200 civilians resettled in for good measure.

Yet the claim of the Philippines on the islands in the South China Sea has never been rooted on historical foundation. The *terra nullius* claim by Tomas Cloma in 1956 is not based on historical claim but simply because the islands "were there for the taking" — unoccupied, uninhabited. This claim stems from the lack of appreciation, ignorance if you will, of the long ties in the history of the Southern Philippines (namely Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan) with mainland Southeast Asia borne by the way we privilege Spanish writings in our history.

Indeed, for 333 years of Spanish rule, the Philippine archipelago had been a wasteland for indigenous historiography. The geographical definition and political configuration of the Philippines only correspond to the Spanish mindset, a triangular shape that remained constant until the coming of the Americans. In this world, the Iranūn operated on another dimension, beyond the purview of the Spaniards. If mentioned at all in their chronicles, the Iranūn are best tuned-out as "pirates", and dismissed as walk-in characters. And even long after the colors of Leon and Castile was carried off into the sunset in 1898, the Iranūn, were never made part of a Philippine history obsessed with "nation-building" that commenced only in late 19th century.

In this way the following statement is understandable and could hardly be faulted:

> We need to finally realise that the Spratly Islands, the meat of our claim in the South China Sea, are not being stolen from us. We have interests over the Spratlys, but that doesn't make it our territory. We are competing with other

countries for ownership **rather than retrieving something that originally belongs to us**.[3] [emphasis — mine]

The Chinese are just too happy with the blindsiding as the historical evidence on the Philippines' claim on the Spratly Islands (Sulawan سُلَوَن) is made to appear non-existent. Yet in fact, the Iranūn holds the very key to the Philippines' claim of ownership of the islands as the following chapters make it crystal clear.

It is a tragedy that the late Senator Tomas Ll. Cabili died in a plane crash, barely a year before Cloma's proclamation. Cabili was perhaps the only Filipino leader of his time who was privy to the ancestral connection of the Philippines and mainland Southeast Asia. A native of Lanao, Cabili knew his folks' genealogic descent well as emanating from the Mabay sa Condor {Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور} [c. 1640-], an Iranūn-Bugis princess who hailed from the *negiri* Pāṇḍuraṅga, the southernmost *kampong* كمفوڠ (principality) of Champā (now Vietnam). Pāṇḍuraṅga is known to the Vietnamese as Phan Rang which they annexed in 1832, now named Ninh Thuận. Cabili's privilege speeches in the *sala* of the senate and his impassioned plea on behalf of the "Moro" in the Constitutional Convention of 1935 is borne out of his knowledge of the history of his people. His refusal to sign the final draft of the 1935 constitution — the only delegate who had the temerity to do so — was his belief that the provenance of his ancestors were not adequately taken into account. Cabili was all too aware that the transition to independence happening throughout Southeast Asia at the end of World War II meant the sealing of national frontiers, and the boxing-in of his people within defined borders, which made them give up the flexibility they and their forebears used to take for granted. Now it haunts us today in the shape of the South China Sea issue.

The island of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn in Vietnamese) off the coast of Cambodia and Champā though well beyond China's Nine-Dashed Line (now Ten-Dashed Line)[4] is pivotal in defining Philippines' sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and (Panacot) Scarborough Shoal. Pulo Condor فولوكُندور had been a transit point of the Iranūn in getting a direct route to mainland Southeast Asia for their trade and seafaring. Its unorthodox route is a more direct alternative to the roundabout west coast-hugging route that goes round Siam and to the Malay Peninsula.

Iranūn's naming convention had the peculiar way of naming their forward bases (settlements) after fruits and vegetables. Kundor (Condor) is the Iranūn word for wax

[3] For the Motherland - Sass Rogando Sasot, https://www.facebook.com/forthemotherlandofficial/photos/a.294984410867212/334324083599911/?type=3>

[4] New map issued on August 28, 2023 by China's Ministry of Natural Resources.

gourd, which in Tagalog (Filipino) is "Kundol". Another Iranūn base off the seacoast of Cambodia is Pulo Ubi فولواوبي (Yam Island). Another island settled by the Iranūn along the Sunda Strait is Pulo Ragondi (Lagondi). "Lagondi" is the Filipino word for the herb *Vitex negundo*. Iranūn plundered ships passing along the Sunda Strait loaded with pepper, a profitable commodity to exchange for tea in Canton, or for ammunition barter with the English traders who were always on standby at Silebu. For the ambush, the Iranūns would position themselves at Pulo Lagondi.[5]

In 1946, having been briefed on several occasions by Senator Tomas Cabili, Elpidio Quirino, (then, the Vice President) reiterated the Philippines' sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Tomas Cabili had been feeding Quirino information from his folks in Mindanao. Using indigenous sources, the Moro statesman briefed Quirino on the provenance of the various islands surrounding the Philippines archipelago. Quirino had caught the bug, and started to inventory the territorial claims of the Philippines. On February 27, 1947, U.S. Governor-General Francis B. Harrison furnished the Philippine Vice-President and foreign affairs secretary, Elpidio Quirino, a *photostat* copy of the Lease Treaty document between the Sultan of Sulu and the British, which was later translated from Malay language and the Arabic script by Professor H. Otley Beyer of the University of the Philippines.

In the meantime, through all the years leading up to today, since the death of Senator Tomas Cabili in a plane crash in 1957 (that also claimed the life of President Ramon Magsaysay), there never had been any update on the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoals in so far as Philippines' historical claim is concerned. So far, Filipino connoisseurs and pundits on the South China Sea issue solely dwell on the theoretical frameworks of our claim with UNCLOS, but could not provide a snippet of narrative — let alone a coherent one — on our historical claims. The trouble with international organizations or institutions, despite the endorsements by many states, is their inability or lack of enforcement mechanism to implement decisions. On the SCS disputes, China's meteoric economic rise and military might choose to disregard the interest of other claimant states or calls for multilateralism. Now, by invoking Philippines' historical claim on the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal, will China finally listen?

The late Sultan a Dimasángkay ko Ranao, as the late statesman Tomas Ll. Cabili had been bestowed by his folk in Lanao, had departed but his ideal of reclaiming the

[5] Note how Iranūn names evolve, i.e. Pandara = Pāṇḍuraṅga(n), the provinces of Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận in Vietnam today; Sawaku in Sarawak is Sawakūngan; so, Lagondi = Ragondī = Lagondīngan = Ragondīngan. The Laguindingan in Misamis Oriental is a toponym of the island. Note the L-R switch in Bisaya. For using Pulo Lagondi as an ambush point for raiding pepper-laden cargo ships passing the Sunda Strait, see: Atsushi, Ota, "From 'piracy' to inter-regional trade: the Sunda Straits zone, c. 1750-1800", IIAS Newsletter #36, March 2005.

provenance of his ancestors — the Iranūn — remains alive with the descendants of the Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور. Thanks to the preservation of the Iranūn *salsilah* (genealogies), the *kirim* scripts, *kishas*, the Darangen and their oral literatures, it is about time that the world come to know to whom the islands had been bequeathed.

Figure 1: *President Elpidio Quirino and Senator Tomas Ll. Cabili (in full regalia) watching a cultural presentation at the latter's bestowal as Sultan a Dimasángkay ko Ranao. To the Sultan's left is the young Ali Dimaporo.*

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL ROUTES: CHENG HE'S FLAT-BOTTOMED EXPEDITIONS

Over the centuries, the China trade routes have many variations on their many nodes, but the east and west coast-hugging routes along the South China Sea had constantly remained the same across the ages, more or less.

> In the Age of Sail two major trade arteries connected coastal China with the world of Southeast Asia: (1) the western route, which followed the coasts of Fujian, Guangdong, and eastern Hainan down to the shores of modern Vietnam and the east side of the Malay peninsula, with various branches reaching out into the Gulf of Siam and extending to northwestern and western Kalimantan, as well as to various destinations around the Java Sea; and (2) the eastern route, which ran from Fujian to Penghu, southern Taiwan, Luzon, the Sulu zone, and on into the Celebes Sea and the Moluccan world.[6]

The direct eastwest routes taken by the Iranūn were not just aberrations. They were chosen for some specific purposes, and one of them is ferrying refugees from mainland Southeast Asia. If usage, stay, and, shuttling to and fro over an extended period of time through the disputed islets in the navel of the South China Sea is any indication of entitlement to their ownership, then it pays to get a grip on the trade circuit routes in general as they were being negotiated in those bygone days as opposed to modern-day voyages. Today, with all the availability of modern navigational equipment, weather satellites and GPS systems, trillions of dollars of business is sieved through the South China Sea annually barely noticed.

[6] Ptak, Roderich, "The Sea Route between Taiwan and the Philippines in Chinese Texts (c. 1100–1600): New Questions Related to an Old Theme", Journal of Asian History, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2016), pp. 47-71

***Figure 2**: The simplest east-west route of the China trade.*
As per Roderich Ptak: "The Chinese trading to the North Moluccas. (The green dotted line shows the direct 'eastern' route; this route appears to have been in use during the Yuan period. The red dotted line shows the route via the Chinese overseas settlements in northern Java; this route was probably used by private Chinese

merchants during the Ming period)".[7] *Note how Spratlys is given a wide berth in both routes."*[8]

China's commercial shipping started late than many other countries. In the 7th century China shipping were limited to small craft plying along the coast, manned by Sinicized Yueh.[9] The Yueh were one of a group of south China people formerly occupying the coastal provinces from Zhejiang (Chekiang) southward, having affinities with the early Yao and early Vietnamese, and founding an empire reaching its greatest height at Canton in Kwangtung (Guang-dong) Province.

It was the Śrīvijaya who largely trail blazed the western route for others to emulate later. They rose and prospered as they fulfilled the Chinese demand for western Asian products. The Chinese, because of her lack of a naval power, was not taking active role in the Asian trade, contenting itself to deal at its own domestic ports. For the long relays, it had to rely on the Arabs, the Indians and the Malays for this segment of the trade. As more Middle Eastern products like aromatics were introduced into the trade, Śrīvijaya took on a bigger role in the Indian Ocean trade with China. Middle Eastern traders found it advantageous to break their journey at Śrīvijaya dispose their cargoes, and take on board Southeast Asian goods for the return trip.

The western route was the most 'civilized' and the safest way to travel, and this was the route taken by Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who boarded foreign boats to travel to Java, Sumatra and India for study, preaching and enlightenment. In conformity with the seven voyages' mission to reach as many polities along the trade route, the route taken by Admiral Zeng He stemmed through the 'civilized' western route. In dealing with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines regarding the South China Sea disputes, China has always emphasized the 14th century navigator Zeng He. Before coming to Manila in 2018 for a state visit, Xi Jinping wrote an opinion piece published by Chinese and Philippine newspapers that declared: "Over 600 years ago, Chinese navigator Zheng He made multiple visits to the Manila Bay on his seven overseas voyages seeking friendship and cooperation."

[7]Ptak Roderich. "The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea - Sulu Zone - North Moluccas (14th to early 16th century)". In: *Archipel*, volume 43, 1992. pp. 27-56; doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/arch.1992.2804; https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1992_num_43_1_2804

[8] *Ibid*.

[9] Leonard, Jane Kate, Wie Yan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World, Harvard East Asian Monographs 111 (Massachusetts, Harvard University, 1984), 42.

***Figure 3**: Mongol-Yuan expedition (1293) and Zheng He's voyages (1405-1433). The routes taken by these two significant Chinese voyages of a political nature never involved the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal.*

This could not be true as in all his voyages, the eunuch Admiral Zheng He had invariably taken a stop at Qui Nhon in Champā, so he could not be anywhere near Luzon, let alone the Manila Bay. The Chinese clearly had gone bonkers on this one. It is one thing to slip up in subtle tampering with the purported import of ancient Chinese writings, but this one unmasks the sheer bankruptcy of China's 'historic' claim. The Chinese were well aware though of the existence of Chinese itinerant traders in Manila in the 15th century. What Zeng He did was, in 1419 he had appointed Haji

Bong Tak Keng based in Qui Nhon in the principality of Vijaya to take care of the flourishing Hanafite Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. In turn, Haji Bong had assigned Haji Can Eng Cu as the "Ki gede Manila".[10] Now this becomes interesting to genealogy aficionados among the Maranao and the Magindanao, as there is a certain Šyarīf Bong in the *kirim* salsilah almost contemporary with Šyarīf Kabungsuwan. Some scholars giving the *kirim* a codicology treatment maintain that Kabungsuwan [c. 1489-] was not an Arab actually. By his very name alone precludes him being one, and it is speculated that his name could be parsed into the Chinese: Ka Bong Chuan, much similar to Bong Tak Keng.

There is also the appointment of the *Ki gede Manila*. The purpose of assigning one was to enable the Chinese get a handle of the itinerant Chinese communities in Matan (Mactan) in the Visayas. This was part of the project of the Ming dynasty to establish a cohesive flourishing Hanafite Muslim Chinese communities in the Malay Peninsula, Java and the Philippines. Java mosques were built in Ancol/Jakatra, Sĕmbung/Cĕrbon, Lasĕm, Tuban, Tse Tsun/Grĕsik, Jiaotung/Joratan, Cangkil / Majakĕrta, and in other places.[11] Mosques were erected at Tutuban in Manila, Batangas and other places, known to the Tagalog as *mansigit* (masgit to the Iranūn) is taken from the Arabic مسجد Masjid, meaning mosque.

This is the first time ever that the name Manila had been explicitly mentioned in any writing. It preceded by more than a century the first Western mention of Manila by the Italian writer Antonio Pigafetta (1521), chronicler of Magellan. According to Dr. Mauyag Maruhom Tamano, the name Manila came from "fi Amanillah," meaning "(be) with the safety of Allah,"[12] though it is just one of the theories floating around. If this was so, one could speculate that the Hanafite Chinese could have lent the place its name much earlier. Even before Bong Tak Keng's posting, there were already a sizeable Hanafite Chinese community in Champā long before the Seven Voyages, who could have gone to the Philippines courtesy of the Iranūn-Bugis in mainland Southeast Asia. And Manila may have even been known as far back as 1225 as *Mali-lu* in the Chu Fan Chih. Around 1290, al-Dimashqī wrote about a population known as al-'Alawiyyin settled in a port in Champā (Sanf in Arabic). They migrated from Hadhramaut, Yemen.[13] Based on this, it is most likely that the 'Alawiyyin that dispersed to the Malay Archipelago and the southern Philippines came from Champā. In the *salsilah*, a Šyarīf Alawi had settled in Tagoloan, northeast of Mindanao, and

[10] H. J. de Graaf and Th. F. Pigeaud, Chinese Muslims in Java
[11] *Ibid*., 71.
[12] Interview by the author at the King Faisal University in Jeddah, 1984.
[13] Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Historical Fact and Fiction (Johor Bahru: University of Technology Malaysia Press, 2011), 130.

another contemporary Šyarīf Alawi had settled in Barira, Buldon around 1450 CE, long before the advent of Šyarīf Kabungsuan. Alawi is also contained in the oral *gugud* of the Talaandig tribe in Bukidnon,[14] whose descendants had migrated to Baloi and upland Lanao. Today, half the town of Madalum, Lanao answer to the surname Alawi. However, these Alawis, in contrast to the Chinese Muslims are of the Safi'in school rather then Hanafi as bared by the *salsila*.[15]

In 1405, according to the Ming shih, the Emperor Yung-lo sent a senior officer to Lŭsong لُسُغ, "who was to govern the country."[16] Does this mean, the Chinese was taking over the archipelago as her sovereign ruler? The relationship was clarified only when Haji Can Eng Cu was appointed to specifically oversee the growing Hanafite Chinese community in the archipelago. In 1408, P'ing-ka-shi-lan (Pangasinan) sent an embassy to the Chinese court. This was followed up in 1408; then in 1410 headed by Ko-ch'a-lao.

Without doubt it was Haji Can Eng Cu who subsequently brokered and orchestrated the various tribute missions from the Philippines *avant la lettre* which allowed him later to obtain the coveted position of Ki gede Manila.

Whereas before the eastern route was neglected because of its small volume of trade compared with the western route, it was now coming to prominence, especially with the spice trade and Sulu as a source of products for the China market. And various polities were scampering, trying to jockey for tributary status to signal their severance from the Majapahit Empire. China who had been surreptitiously undermining the demise of the Majapahit encouraged the move. In 1410 CE, Brunei's new king formally appealed to the Emperor of China that he should not be paying tribute anymore to Java[17] but to the Celestial throne, which was granted[18]. In 1417 Saripada Paduka Batara II[19] [c. 1362-] headed a Sulu delegation to the Imperial court. He had brought with him his nephew Kalomanting {Maharajadiraja Batúa Nasuran (Kamalud-din), who was only about 12 years old at the time, and Rajâ Baguinda Paduka Prabu [born c. 1365]. This was a turning point as this inaugurated Sulu's cessation as a dependency of the

[14] Unabia, Carmin Ching. "Gugud: Bukidnon Oral Tradition", Asian Folklore Studies Vol. 44, 1985, 205-209, Central Luzon University, Muñoz.

[15] "Naso Sayikh Solaiman a watao o Tuansi sa Dyuhor a pagari o Īmam sa Safi'in sa Makah." Quote transliterated from the *kirim* manuscript of Baì Pinongki, *Sĕlĕsîlah a Buldong*, *Barira* (Image DSC-0318).

[16] Laufer, Bethold, Relations of Chinese to the Philippines, Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, Vol. L. Quarterly Issue, Vol. IV), 257

[17] Majapahit Empire.

[18] Brown, D.E. Brunei : The Structure and History of a Borneo Malay Sultanate, Star Press, Brunei, 1970, p. 133; Cesar Adib Majul, An Analysis of the "Genealogy of Sulu". In: *Archipel*, volume 22, 1981. pp. 167-182; doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/arch.1981.1677.
https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1981_num_22_1_1677], p.176.

[19] Sipad II) Sri Pada (Baduge Badala) 巴都葛叭答剌 (Puduka Patala)

Majapahit Empire. On their way home the Saripada got sick and died in China on Oct. 23, 1417.

Champā remained fortunate because of its location along the coast-hugging traditional west route in which all shipping between China and the rest of the world except the Philippines and Japan must pass along its coastlines. From CE 300, Champā started its prosperous growth that lasted well until CE 1500. "Most of this shipping was manned by Austronesian-speakers. Not until the 12th century did Chinese take a significant role themselves in the trade, and only in the sixteenth did they become dominant in it at the expense of Malays and Javanese (Reid 1993a, 36-45)."*

To create niche market, an east front was developed during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) by the spice traders of which the Iranūns and the Bugis figured prominently. This is the route taken for goods meant for Ḅaì (Manila kingdom), Sulu, Java, Maluku, Butuan, and East Borneo, Kalimantan and the eastern archipelagoes. These route made an efficient gathering of local produce for ultimate shipment to China. Generally the terminus of the eastern route is Maluku. However, a few of the long-ranging Iranūn who wish to cut off middle-men at intermediate ports often do not wait for the monsoon winds to reverse its course and so they chose to extend their journeys all the way to Śrīvijaya where their native products fetched high prices.

Contrary to common belief, the traders that appear in Philippine ports such as M-ai (Bai of Laguna), Matan (Mactan), Sulu, and Butuan were not Chinese in the beginning. These route is part of the network of the acculturated Lŭtao-Iranūn mistaken as Chinese by the natives of Southeast Asia because they spoke and dresses like Hanafite[20] Chinese. They maintain a few forward bases and settlements along the Taiwan Strait, famous of which was the Penghu Lehtao Island. In this way, even when the authorities close their doors to outsiders as they used to intermittently, either restricting trade to tributary or closing its borders to foreign ships, the Lŭtao-Iranūn still managed to dispose their cargo and get their return cargo by a clandestine arrangement with the Chinese smugglers at the Fujian coast, thus fostering a shadow economy without break.

Having laid out these two traditional routes, the rest of this monograph, will dwell mostly on the unorthodox routes of the Iranūn as they fit mostly the discussion on the claims on the disputed islands in the South China Sea.

[20] Hanafites are Muslims who are adherent of the Hanafi school of thought. It is generally acknowledged by Islamic scholars that the Hanafi school used to be the dominant sect among Muslims in the Philippines, only to be overtaken by the Safi'i at a much later period.

CHAPTER 3 UNFREEZING BORDERS: REOPENING OLD WOUNDS

"…from a state-based perspective of sea claimants, academic analysis has mostly focused on Vietnam and the Philippines. They are the ones with more compelling interests in the dispute, or vanguard states within ASEAN."[21]

But if we strip off these two nation-states of their modern barks, what we get are two ancient peoples: the Chām and the Iranūn. Indeed, if I have to award the disputed islands in the South China Sea, I would — hands down —award them to only these two special peoples. And if I have to break them down between the two of them, I would award the Paracels to the Chām as I would the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals to the Iranūn. Nothing can be more to the point and neat than that.

Sadly these once proud people, now reduced to ciphers, are nowhere having the wherewithal to pursue their claim on their own. They are only reluctantly 'hosted' by the contending modern states that ring the South China Sea. Even worse, these countries — Cambodia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam — are loathe to acknowledge these two people's contributions to their national patrimony. The once mighty polities of Chām and the intrepid Iranūn are but a memory. Successively the *kampong* كمفوڠ (principalities) of the Chām, over the centuries, fell like dominoes to the onslaught of the Đại Việt: Indrapura, Amaravathi, Vijaya, Kauṭharā, and Pāṇḍuraṅga. The ancient civilization of Cham had been obscured because it was an affront and an embarrassment to both Vietnamese and Khmer nationalism. However, "they were a maritime and mobile people whose influence was felt as far afield as Java, Sulawesi

[21] Rubiolo, M. Florencia, "The South China Sea Dispute: A Reflection of Southeast Asia's Economic and Strategic Dilemmas (2009-2018)", *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad*. Print version ISSN 1909-3063 rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur. vol.15 no.2 Bogotá July/Dec. 2020 Epub Sep 25, 2020. https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.4336. *See* Southgate, L. & Khoo, N. (2016). Enter the vanguard state: Reinterpreting asean's response to the South China Sea issue. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 3*(2), 221–244.

and the Philippines,"[22] that to retrieve its history is also key to reclaiming the Philippines' past.

The Iranūn, on the other hand, now only dwell in songs and the panegyrics of the Darangen[23]. All their forward bases and settlements they once nurtured peppered over the wide swath of waters of Southeast Asia had been absorbed by modern-day states. Iranūn in Malaysia and Indonesia were forced to abandon their identity. The Sulu archipelagoes which they had propped up vanished; the Magindanao cottas on which they fought tooth and limb were overran. Even the emerging of what could have been the first flowering of an Iranūn state of Marudu at the northern tip of Borneo and the allied regions like Tempasuk had been nipped in the bud in 1845 by the 'White Raja' in cohort with the British and Brunei.

Resurrecting these anachronistic peoples, a once proud race, who had long ago overstayed their usefulness, seems at odds with modern dialogues of nations. But they are the very key in resolving the impasse at the South China Sea, which now threatens the very security of the world, nay, its very existence. Now these desperate, god-forsaken reefs and shoals that reminds the world of these peoples' former glory are being denied them as they are now being usurped by the mighty powers of the day, thanks to the trillions worth of business that passes through the South China Sea and the potential deposits of oil and gas underneath.

The beginnings of Champā and the routes less travelled is the oldest

If constant 'usage' and 'occupation' of the disputed islands are to be made the determinant factor of ownership, then it pays to trace, however briefly, how these two peoples' fate have crisscrossed over a millennium. Theirs were characteristic of the Austronesian mariners who rove the South China Sea of the pre-modern world.

[22] Anthony Reid, "The Chams in the Southeast Asian Maritime System", Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia(Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), 40.

[23] The Darangen, an epic a body of works of about 17 cycles (in iambic tetrameter) that had been proclaimed as one of the Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2005, affords us a rare window into the bygone past no other Philippine literature could ever provide. The extensive hoard of Sanskrit words that old Maranao-Iranūn brings to bear on linguistic theories allows gauging patterns of change and continuity. With its rich sets of genealogies, it maps the relationships of kingdoms and their rise and fall. The Darangan is an encyclopedic manual on statecraft, court behaviors, etiquette, etc.



***Figure 4**: The earliest route taken by the Austronesian to mainland Southeast Asia was unorthodox.*

The earliest Chams came from the southwest coast of Mindanao then called Tebouk تُبوك and the southeast part of Borneo (East Kalimantan) before they were joined in by the more southern Javanese and then later by the Malays at large. The route they took to reach the mainland was uncommonly straightforward characteristic of the hopscotch approach of Austronesian navigators as opposed to the later coast-hugging route that characterized the traditional route.

The Austronesian-Iranūn from Tebouk تُبوك Mindanao) took their springy padau (prahu) boats to Champā via the route Palawan فَلَوَن ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن (Spratlys) ⇒ Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn) ⇒Pāṇḍuraṅga ⇒Vijaya. This must have been the route taken by the raids against the Cham town in 774 and 787, and against Tongking in 767. The raiders were described in the Cham inscriptions as "ferocious, pitiless, dark-skinned sea raiders." Coedes and other writers presumed them to be Javanese, but Hall thought they might just as well have been local boat people. If we compare it with the

dark-skinned Pi-sho-ye (Visayan) raids on the Fujian Coast in 1174-1190 CE, in Chau Ju Kua's Zhu fan zhi 諸蕃志 (Treatise on the Various Barbarians), we find the similarity of descriptions in their countenance and their method of attack. In the raid on Champā, the assailants used the island of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور as their staging point; in the Pi-sho-ye raids, they launch their attack from the Penghu-Leihtao Island to access the Fujian coast. And both these launching pads were Iranūn bases.

Tebouk تُبوك in the 3rd to 6th century was a seaboard kingdom that encompassed what the kirim referred to as *Batal o Pagilidan* بَتَلوفغِليدَن. This refers to all the shorelines that enclose the Laut Sulawesi (formerly Celebes Sea). The seafaring Iranūn of the Illana Bay spoke of the Pat sagé a ragat or the quadrant that bound the Sulawesi Sea as their ancient bailiwick.

The names Tchou-po and Tou-po are Chinese transcriptions of the Maranao-Magindanao word Tĕbóu which means the "stalk of a sugar cane." The final guttural stop is represented by the letter 'q' in many other languages (like in Africa), so it comes to be transcribed as Tĕbóuq. Tebouk تُبوك is already known in the 3rd century during the Sui period (589-618 AD). It lay on a large island where "more than ten kings ruled".[24]

The early connection between this area and mainland Southeast Asia is best exemplified by the Hindu temples in East Kalimantan.

The oldest inscriptions in the island Southeast Asia were discovered in the west side of the quadrant (West Borneo) at Muara Kanam, a hundred miles inland on the Mahakm river that date back to early 5th century.[25] This was way before Campā first occurs in an inscription at My Son in 658. It was the polity called by the Chinese as "Linyi" whose Indic culture had been absorbed by the migrating Austronesians and brought back for diffusion in the islands that ringed the Laut Sulawesi.

The early 5th century inscriptions at Muara Kanam is a manifestation of the localization of Indic influences in the region. It would be ideal to find a similar inscriptions in Mindanao, but sadly, the preponderance of archeological digs in the Philippines are done in non-Muslim areas. The lack of archeological excavations proves to be a handicap and makes comparisons difficult. Among the countryside folks of Lanao, a legend that survives to this very day is that in a dank region of the highlands of Butig, in a place believed to be Pinjaman, ruins of ancient structures had

[24] Moens, Ir. J. L., & de Touche, R. J. (1940). SRĪVIJAYA, YĀVA EN KATĀHA. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 17(2 (134)), 1–108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41559943

[25] Vlekke, Bernard H. M., *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia* (1959), 21.

caved in, in which statutes (*barahala*), obelisks, and steles are overrun by vegetation. Stories circulating among local inhabitants say that stubs of mukhalinga[26] could still be seen as outcroppings in the hilly areas of Butig Unayan. Most of these were said as lay buried under ash because of several eruptions of Mt. Magatori (Makaturing), the latest of which was in 1765. Until now, because its perimeter has been for decades infested by outlaws, rebels and lately by the so-called ISIS groups [27] seeking sanctuaries from the law, an archeological expedition in the area has yet to be attempted.

Nevertheless, a translation of one of the inscriptions is of interest to the Iranūn:

> The famous prince Kudungga the Eminent had a son, the renowned Açvavarman, the founder of a dynasty, who is comparable to Amçuman. Three sons he had who were like three sacrificial fires. The most excellent of these, renowned for the power of his and for his self-control, is His Majesty Mulavarman, the Lord and King who brought offerings of gold. In remembrance of these offerings this sacrificial pillar has been erected by the principal ones of those who have been twice born.[28]

Vlekke wrote that though one could speculate that the inscription may be the work of a Hindu:

> …it may just as well be the work of an Indonesian who had completely mastered Sanskrit language and adopted Hindu civilization. Some evidence in favor of the latter possibility may be found in the mentioned in the inscription. Mulavarman is a Sanskrit name; Kundungga, however, may well be an Indonesian name. Açvavarman is undoubtedly Sanskrit, and this prince, although second in the line of succession, is mentioned as the founder of the dynasty. From these facts, we may perhaps conclude to a gradual assimilation to Hindu culture of an already existing Indonesian kingdom.[29]

What makes the inscription remarkable from the point of view of the Iranūn is that Açvavarman is the equivalent of Acraman in Maranao. Vlekke had also made

[26] Mukhalinga is a linga with one or more faces, a Hindu iconography.
[27] A local grouping in the Philippines that adheres to the ideals of the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham."
[28] Vekke, 21. The author's translation from the Dutch version given by N. J. Krom in HFG, 67 (first ed.)
[29] *Ibid*, 21.

reference to an inscription carved in a rock at the foot of the mountain south of Jacarta next to the imprints of two human feet, said to be the imprints of the feet of "the powerful ruler, the illustrious Purnavarman, king of Taruma, whose footsteps are like those of Vishnu"[30]. This is akin to the so-called foot imprints of Manggai and Radya Indarapatra in Masiu, in the highlands of Lanao. Purnavarman is Purnaman in Iranūn.

Vlekke had not given a hint as to the source of the inspirations for the Hindu inscriptions. The inscriptions are apparently the remnant of a state, whose rulers, centuries, had adopted the Hindu-based culture based on their experiences with the Champā civilization on the mainland. The intrepid Austronesians from Tebouk تُبوك or the lands that ringed the Patsagí ko ragat had initially approached the coastal valleys of Linyi at Pāṇḍuraṅga. Sometime in the 2nd century CE, they joined larger bands of Austronesians from Java, which gradually migrated towards the north, until they took over the international trade of Linyi which they then forged to become the later Champā.

[30] *Ibid*, 22. The inscriptions have been translated by the author from the Dutch version given by N. J. Krom in HFG, 75-77.

CHAPTER 4 *CARTA INDIGENA FILIPINA*: THE UNKNOWN IRANŪN PORTULAN

The Iranūn's prodigious knowledge of the seascape and islands of Southeast Asia and beyond is unmatched. Not even the Bugis, a late entrant in the 16th century, could come close. The Iranūn had acted as skippers for the Portuguese in their quest to reach China, when the South China Sea was then still called the Champā Sea. What the early Spaniards had learned about the early cartography of Asia came from Iranūn mariners:

> We have not seen this island (Xipon [ʃi'ponl = Japan), and what I shall say about it has been related to us by the Moros who carry on trade with that land.[31]

The Iberian's attempt to gain foothold on mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia, suffered multiple setbacks, as their ships floundered time and again borne by their inexperience in the South China Sea. They were unlike the Iranūn whose knowledge of the weather, the sea terrain, allowed them to move swiftly through their unorthodox passages they had charted for centuries.

The 1734 "Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Islas Filipinas" published by the Jesuit Pedro Murillo is dubbed as the "mother of all Philippine maps", but the only truly indigenous map of the Philippines that nobody heard, that depicts the South China Sea in its gore and glory is the *Carta Indigena Filipina* housed at *Museo Naval de Madrid* in Spain. Yet thanks to the built-in prejudice against the "Moro pirate", this damning evidence together with the *kirim* oral tradition had been elided and had never been taken to account the Philippines' claim on Spratlys given the mobile and agile nature of the Iranūn.

[31] Captain Diego De Artieda's reports ca. 1570 in Blair, E. H., The Philippines Islands, 1493-1803, Volume III 1569-1576). Japan is Apon in Iranūn.

The map is an Iranūn-Ugi Portulan donated to the Madrid's *Museo de Naval* in 1847 under España Ministerio de Defensa. AMN-58-16. It is formally designated by the curators of the *Museo* as "Carta Indigena Filipina". The map was contained inside a bamboo tube taken from the breastwork of a "Moro pirate" ship captured near the waters of the Sulu archipelago. Unlike the Murillo map, the Iranūn chart was drafted in ink on cowhide, with highlights in various colors. It measures approximately 72 by 90 centimeters. The northern limit is about 17° or 18°N latitude, so they include much of mainland Southeast Asia and the Philippines.[32] Obviously, it was essayed to contain the unorthodox route the Iranūn take in their trading and raiding, taking note of their forward bases, their haunts, and settlements represented by the profusion of dots on the chart.

***Figure 5**. 18th century Moro-Iranūn portulan (Museo Naval, Madrid). Photo Courtesy of Jean Paul Potet, made available to the author especially for this publication.*

[32] The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 2, Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, 832-833.

> *Of the sixty maps presented in Antonio T. Carpio's 2014 Cartographic Exhibit "Historical Truth and Lies, Scarborough Shoal in Ancient Maps", not one of them was indigenous to the Filipino.*

The map was submitted to an unnamed Spanish naval officer for scrutiny, who subsequently donated it to the Museo. In those days it was customary to transport all loots from the "Moro" in the Philippines to Madrid. It was the *Museo de Ejército de Madrid* that housed the bulk of the artifacts and heirlooms. Arrayed along the steps of the main staircase and in the Sala de Ultramar (Overseas Room) were several lantakas, curious revolving bronze cannons, of different calibers. This was the main draw of the *Museo* for tourists as featured in their brochures. As Gabriel Rodriguez wrote in Los Recuerdos de la luchas contra la Piratería en Filipinas, "they were the memories of the fight against Malay-Mohammedan piracy in the Philippines".[33]

The Moro used to hold on to their own defenses. But since the advent of the steamship in the second half of the 19th century, the Spaniards were having a field day. The Moro were slowly but steadily reduced to being land-locked. These led to the proliferations of cottas in the highlands of Magindanao, Lanao, and Sulu. Among the collections in the *Museo* were the lantakas and bladed weapons retrieved from the cotta Pagalugán of Maghuda datto[34] in 1861 Rio Grande de Mindanao (Pulangi). Another display which the author managed to identify was a culverin (#6552) at the Escalera de Acceso of the Ultramar Room which was taken from the second Spanish campaign in Marahui (now Marawi), in the highland of Lanao on March 10, 1895.[35] (For a discussion on the possibility of a plan to have some of the collections loaned to Philippine museums under the International Council of Museums (ICOM) guidelines of UNESCO, see the author's article at The Manila Times: *Caché of vintage Philippine weaponry caught in the politics of Spanish museums*, dated January 31, 2023.)

The provenance of the "Carta Indigena Filipina" found from the Iranūn-Moro "pirate ship" is pivotal to the Philippine's claim on the Spratlys for the cartography cleanly

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[33] Rodriguez, Gabriel, "Los Recuerdos de la luchas contra la Piratería en Filipinas", Por MEM1803 in Historia del Museo (July 22, 2014). <https://amigosmuseoejercitomadrid.com/2014/07/22/los-recuerdos-de-la-luchas-contra-la-pirateria-en-filipinas-por-gabriel-rodriguez/>

[34] *Genealogy ref*.: Manguda Datu Dabpil, an Iranūn-Magindanao, was a son of Datu Gandawali Mamalagui Sahabuddin and Tuanbai Uday sa Butig. Manguda Datu Dabpil was not killed but managed to survive by retreating with some of his warriors. Manguda Datu Dabpil was a 9th generation descendant of Mabay sa Condor, our main subject in the related chapter.

[35] This was when Datu Akadir (Amaī Pakpak) was martyred in the Battle of Marahui (now Marawi). The culverin was part of the cotta's light arsenal to complement the heavier cannons of the Iranūn-Maranao. They were probably handled by the womenfolk of the cottas. Amaī Pakpak was married to two women. The first wife was Ḅai Mandiyanai (Menjanai), a daughter of Datu Palawan فَلَوَن {Sultan sa Ganassi ika-7}. Their only son Pakpak was also killed in the battle. Anggay {Radyâ Mūda sa Marahui} was another son of Amaī Pakpak with his second wife Ḅai Ataok (Daptar), a daughter of Lakungan {Watāmama sa Magindanao}. He too was martyred in the 1895 battle. All these bygone folks were late descendants of Mabay sa Condor.

shows how intimately the Iranūn knew minute details of the South China Sea. Unlike other older maps, this one prominently shows the haunts of the Iranūn, and such areas in the South China Sea.

***Figure 6**: A 19th century contiguous Iranūn kirim script more than 4-meter long preserved in a bamboo canister like the Carta Indigena Filipina.*
Photo taken by the author with permission from the library of the late Mokamad {Guro sa Maçiu} Guro at Tamparan, Lanao del Sur, Philippines. (An earlier photo published by Kawashima Midori at Sofia University in Japan, was blurred.

To make clear the origin of this "Moro" map, it needs some unpacking. First, the *Museo* refer to it as a Carta Indigena Filipina because it was found within the waters of the Philippines, and in a Moro pirate ship at that, so the Spanish displayed it along with other Moro memorabilia. When Dutch cartographers saw the labelling written in lontara, they called it a Bugis map or portulan, which could mean that though they may be in use by the Lŭtao-Iranūn in their navigation, the said map had been made by a Bugis. But this is not the case. The Lŭtao-Iranūn were also well-versed in the "lontara" known to them as *rontara*. Along with the *Baybayin*, it is a descendant of the *kawi* script, which had been around 800 CE in maritime Southeast Asia. Given the language and the script of the Laguna Copperplate Inscription (LCI) found in Luzon dated 900 CE, we can be confident in asserting also that the charts could only have been made by the Lŭtao-Iranūn, who along with the Bugis were, hands down, the foremost masters in navigating the twin routes to China.[36]

For Iranūn to adapt to Bugis writing would be a breeze. The explosion of the Palao Magatory (Mt. Makaturing) in 1765 saw the fanning out of the Iranūn out of the Illana Bay to join their kindred in other archipelagos and *point d'appui* on strategic forward bases as they pursue their raiding and commerce. During the 1760s, a massive ethnic migration of the Iranūn-Maranao and Iranūn-Magindanao to other islands in Sulu (Sooloo), such as Basilan بَسيلَن Island, Sambuangan سَمبُوَغن (Zamboanga), Tawi-tawi, and North Borneo (Tampasook, Pandassan, Marudu, and Tawarran) took place.

Thanks to the widely spread Iranūn and Bugis in Southeast Asia, a more accurate map of the area could now be drawn. Whereas previously, most of the published maps were done by cartographers of Holland, the experience and interaction, though ending "unhappy", of the British with the Bugis and the Iranūn on Pulo Condor فولوكُندور give them a much pretty accurate picture of the geography of the Islands on the Champā Sea (misnamed South China Sea by the Portuguese), so that for the first time an accurate map had been drawn, published in London in 1770. The map shows the Spratlys as shelves of Parago (Palawan فَلَوَن).

Differences between the Moro-Iranūn portulan at Madrid and the Bugis portulan at Utrecht

The Carta Indegina Filipina taken from a "pirate" Moro ship cannot be considered a Bugis map just because it featured Bugis script as it too cannot be an Arab map simply

[36] For an updated discussion of the provenance of the LCI, the author had made his own investigation and drawn his own conclusion on it, which will be incorporated in the first installment of the seven-volume Sapadan sa Iranūn series to be published at a future date.

because it contained Arabic numerals for depth figures. The early Iranūn wrote well not only kirim, a derivative of the Jawi, but also in Bugis script (lontara or rontara in Iranūn) as they do Baybayin too. In fact, there was a long standing tradition of cartographic culture among the Iranūns and to a certain extent helped early Europeans, especially the Portuguese in mapping Southeast, not to mention piloting for them as skippers. This tradition was noted by Thomas Forrest when he visited Mindanao. Exchange of knowledge then between the Bugis and the Iranūn had been constant through the centuries. There had been a lot of kinship intermarriages that occurred between these two peoples too. According the ijma and tartib, Sulawesi (Maladao) is one of the seven *aklim* (region) to which the Iranūn owes its ancestry.

The relation between the Iranūn orangkayas which dominated the Ruma Bichara[37] of Sulog سولُغ (Sulu) and the Bugis were extensive. Like the Iranūn, they formed the bulkhead of the polyglot maritime forces that catered to the mercenary needs of Champā, Cambodia, Siam and Burma. The most famous example of intermarriage between the two peoples is when Datu Dungun (Badar ud-din) {Sultan of Sulu 1718-1734}, a grandson of Râja Bongsu, married a Bugis princess, We Tenri Puteri ri Soppéng, daughter of the Arumponi[38] Arung Palakka {La Maddussallat Sultan Adam} by one of his wives, We Adda Matinroe ri MadeIlo {Datu Soppeng} [1691-1705]. It is from Putri Soppéng that the Kiram branch of the Sultanate had spawned out through the controversial Datu Lagasan (Azim ud-din I) (Alim ud-Din I) {Sultan of Sulu} [r.1735-1748 and 1764-1773].

Collaboration between the Bugis and the Iranūn reached its peak in 1765 when Mt. Magatori exploded and many coastal Iranūns sojourned overseas after most of Lanao and parts of Magindanao were made devoid of economic subsistence by the devastation. This was exacerbated by the falling out that ensued between Marāja Layla Yūsup (Datoo Malfalla), son of Anwār and Datu Panglū Maulana Fahr ud-Din (Pakāruddīn) {Sultan sa Maguindanao1755-1780}, son of Jāpar Sādik Manāmir {Šahīd Wapāt}. Despite intermarriages among the progenies of Bayan ul- Anwār and Japar

[37] The Ruma Bichara of Sulu is a merchant's guild presided over by the Sultan. It is composed of wealthy orangkayas with each one maintaining a maritime fleet. They help the king formulate important decisions and supports him financially and militarily like waging a battle, embarking on commercial expeditions or the raiding of enemies.

[38] Arumponi which is an abbreviation of Arung Boni (King of Bone) is a title still current in the highlands of Lanao which had degenerated into a proper noun over the centuries. There is, for example, Arumponi sa Maluso [c.1745], a son of Ŭmbāör ika-2 sa Bansayan [c. 1720-] (Genealogy ref.: Sempad a Maradika a Paninggalan sa Ranao - Vol. I by Tingcap G. Pandi; Dalŭm ā Poōna Bayabao (Heritage of Lanao - Part 4) by Aksaran (Hadji Abdul Rauf) Amisa (Amin Zacaria); Gata Poönā Bayabao: T'lo ā Panoroganan by Sultan Sukarno Magarang. Another one is Aromponi Amaī Tauala, a son of Balindong Adel sa Paraäba (Genealogy ref.: Salsila sa Ganassi (21 ka Lokês) by Moh'd. Taib Sarip ko Maruhom Adil sa Ganassi). Another one is Aromponi sa Daänā Ingêd, a son of Dalumangkob sa Daänā Ingêd Macatimbang [c. 1745] (Genealogy ref.: Mĕrhoum Amimoto {Datu sa Marantao} [Daänā Ingêd] Sĕlĕsîlah by Kakai Bantog).

Sadik Manamir, the rivalry continues in later generations. Anwār's descendants identified themselves with the powerful maritime Tebuk while Manamir's had to bite the bullet to have the Magindanao seat, accommodating the Spaniards as balance against the Iranūn threat.

Datu Malfalla, unable to stand the insinuation of the Spaniards at the Sultanate of Magindanao, chose to establish bases in Laut Sulawesi with the Iranūn from Tebouk تْبوك. They were, among others, Tontoli, Dampelas, Tobungku, Tanah Jampea, and Lambok. This intensified collaboration between the Bugis and the Iranūn that included exchanges of information on far-flung areas. Tontoli (also known as Totoli to the Iranūn) in central Sulawesi had then become a major base for thousands of Iranūn.[39]

***Figure 7**: Boeginese zeekaart van de Indische Archipel (ca. 1820) at Universiteitsbibliotheek Utrecht, Netherlands.*
Unlike the Moro portolan at Madrid, it does not indicate red outline on Palawan ڤَلَوَن, which is an Iranūn stronghold. Difference like this indicates that the Madrid map was wrought by a Moro cartographer.

The portulan at Ultrecht and the Carta Indegina Filipina at Madrid have mutual influences and show remarkable similarities (almost identical) in their contours but

[39] Hunt, J. (1967). "Some Particular Relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia" in J.H. Moore [ed.]. Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries. London: Frank Cass.

for their annotations. According to Dr. Marco van Egmond, curator at the Ultrecht University, the Ultrecht portulan was better preserved than the Madrid portulan. However, unlike the latter, the provenance of the Ultrecht copy could not be established. Egmond speculated that "it may well be assumed that this chart was also seized from Buginese fishermen and traders and used by indigenous pirates." Given the preponderance of Iranūn in Sulawesi at the time, it could as well have been taken from one of their prahus that plied the Laut Sulawesi. The Iranūn had been the most aggressive and hungry for loot after they had fanned out following the explosion of Mt. Magatori (Makaturing) that laid their vegetation to waste for decades. Between 1774 and 1798, the Iranūns made multiple attacks on Dutch and Spanish merchant ships.[40]

A precious relationship: Dynamics of the Iranūn-Bugis tandem in Southeast Asia

The dynamics of the relationship between the Bugis and the Iranūn had come a long way. Their lives had been entwined as they have kept exchanging information, culture, and have entered into marriage alliances over the centuries. According to the *tartib* of the Maranao-Iranūn there are seven *aklims* (regions) in the *patsagi a ragat* (quadrant of Laut Sulawesi) to which they are blood-related. The *aklims* in typical Iranūn script are: سو مالوكو مالادو، سو بورونواي (برونيي) ، سو سولوغ، ماڠانان سا جهور، تمان سا ماغندناناو ، سامفورنا سا تاغولوان. *So Maluku Maladao, so Boronai, so Sulog* سولُغ, *manganan sa Dyuhur taman sa Magindanao, na Sampurna sa Tagoloan*.[41] One of these aklims, Maladau (Manado) stands for the whole island of Sulawesi itself of which the Bugis had been dominant.

In the 1920s Prof. Otley Beyer of the University of the Philippines had asked Hans Overbeck to look for any Malay literature which could throw light on the connections between the Malay kingdoms of the British and Dutch East and those of the Southern Philippines. While rummaging inside a bookshop in Singapore, Overbeck found the manuscript "Silsilah Mĕlayu dan Bugis dan Sakalian Raja-raj a-nya" written by Raja Ali Al-haji in AH 1329 (about CE 1900). Apparently, Overbeck could not make any connection as he said the search "proved disappointing". The work is about the five

[40] Ali, Ismail, Petempatan lanun di Kepulauan Borneo, 23 May 2016, LAUT BUKAN PEMISAH, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Utusan Borneo (Sabah)

[41] Rendering by Bai Papanok Pamuwwadan (Sittie Farhana) Somacŭm of Binidayan, Lanao del Sur [1952-].

adventurer Bugis princes who made a fortune and attained fame in the smaller kingdoms of Riau, Sambas, Matan and Mĕmpawah.[42]



***Figure 8**: Replica of a page of 'Tuhfat al-Nafis'.*
A Bugis genealogy in 'Tuhfat al-Nafis' manuscript in Jawi script, pp. 16-17 of KITV Or. 65 at the Royal Institue of Linguistics and Anthropolgy at Lieden.

Raja Ali Al-haji[43] had written another work though, the *Tuhfat Al-Nafis* which among other things intimately portrayed the Iranūn exploits in Tanjung Pinang. When coupled with the writings of the Dutch and genealogical inferences of the *kirim*

[42] Overbeck, Hans. "Silsilah Melayu Dan Bugis Dan Sakalian Raja-raja-nya." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 4*, no. 3 (98) (1926): 339-81.

[43] Raja Ali Haji bin Raja Haji Ahmad (1808/9–1869/75) was a 19th-century Bugis-Malay historian, poet and scholar. He was elevated to the status of National Hero of Indonesia in 2004. Haji has been described as one of the most important Malay writers of the 19th century. Riddell, Peter G. (2001). *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses*. Hurst. pp. 188–189. ISBN 978-1-85065-336-3; Salleh, Siti Hawa Hj (2010). *Malay Literature of the 19th Century*. ITBM. p. 136. ISBN 978-983-068-517-5.

salsilahs of the Iranūn, they give us accurate overview of the relationship between the Bugis, the Iranūn, and the Sultanate of Johor.

Other Iranūn maps in existence

There should be numerous maps by the Iranūn in existence but could not be located. They got other details of their map beyond Southeast Asia from friendly Europeans like Thomas Forrest who visited Mindanao during 1774-1776. Pakīr Mawlāna Kamza (Al Faqih Maulana) was noted in an 1832 catalog of Malay manuscripts presented Captain Thomas Forrest with several navigation maps written in "Maghindanao." Le Roux said that one of these maps was to be in the London Museum, noting a statement in the catalog of the Bibliotheca Marsdeniana in London that says "a map of the Dutch East Indies is in the collection of the Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap [Dutch Bible Society], on which the names are written intermittently in Makassar [Bugi] script."[44]

Another European who had exchanged map ideas with the Iranūn was Alexander Dalrymple. He relied on local sources, including maps, to supplement his own hydrographic charting.

> His "Map of Part of Borneo and the Sooloo Archipelago: Laid down Chiefly from Observations Made in 1761, 2, 3, and 4," published on 30 November 1770, bears a note just below the title that reads, "The Coast of Borneo from Unsang [east of Sandakan in what is now Sabah] Southward is not confirmed by any exact Observations but is laid down from a Sketch of Dato Saraphodin and from a Chart of Noquedah Koplo who came up that Coast in 1761."[45]

Datu Saraphodin was Mustafa Sharap ud-Din, who later became the Sultan of Sulu [r.1789-1808]. Noquedah Koplo is the Iranūn Nakhoda Kapāla (कपाल) Batokapāla (Bato Seri). He is the father-in-law of Romaô {Rajâ di Laut} {Datu sa Kalūdan sa Bayang}, a son of Īmam Dīwan Ŭmbarong.[46]

The inputs made by locals in the development of European maps were tremendous. A navigator that Dalrymple had been mostly impressed with was a nonagenarian

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[44] *The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 2*, 838.

[45] *Ibid*.

[46] Genealogy ref.: Gomisá sa Marahui by Kakai Bantog B. R. Matanog sa Kialdan, Marantao; Patawŭ Baÿamală Sampurna sa Taraca from the Masacal archives of Datu Adoc Bagumbaran; Amaī Sanggacala's Essay on Genealogy and the General State of the Ranaū-Iranūn (1789-1916) by Sheik Mustapha Pacasum, a transcription from his 1951 narration.

known as Bahatol. Bahatol's mental mapping of the islands and coastlines of the Sulu archipelago borne by years of experience was remarkable as "a work of natural genius". Dalrymple noted that "from his youth, Bahatol delighted in visiting foreign parts, from which disposition indulged, he attained great knowledge, at the same time that he was ever a model of meekness and modesty."[47] However, this ability is common and the knowledge is shared by countless Iranūn who knew the contours of the seascape like the palms of their hands. As usual, in their excitement, Europeans thought it needless to know the background of their source. Bahatol was Datu Bahatul, a grandson of Orangkaya Manuk Sumandak [c. 1710-]. Orangkaya Manuk is the patriarch of the Butu Abdul Baqui [1865-1937] clan of Sulu.[48]

[47] Dalrymple, Alexander, *Oriental Repertory*, 501.

[48] Genealogy ref.: *Descendants of Mantiri Asip sa Menangkabaw*, by Butu Abdul Baqui [1865-1937].

CHAPTER 5 THE SPECIAL CASE OF PANAKOT (SCARBOROUGH SHOAL)

The 18th-century map "Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Islas Filipinas" better known as the 1734 Murillo Velarde Map became a celebrity among Philippine maps because it shows cleanly the Scarborough Shoal then identified on it as the Panacot. The map also shows the shape of the atoll as consistent with the current maps available as today. Scarborough is the largest atoll in the South China Sea, located some 220 kilometers from the Philippines. The shoal is located inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines but is claimed by China as its ancestral territory since the 13th century.[49]

***Figure 9**: Actual photo of Panacot, now called Scarborough Shoal. Satellite imagery taken by Landsat 7on February 23, 2000 (source: www.oceandots.com)*

[49] François-Xavier Bonnet, "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal," Irasec's Discussion Papers, No. 14, November 2012, www.irasec.com

***Figure 10**: The Panacot as drawn in the 1734 Velarde map*

The Chinese claims Panakot is part of the Zhongsha Islands, a collection of shoals, seamounts and skerries in the South China Sea. The Zhongsha Dao (Macclesfield Bank) the main part has no islands, in fact. The Panakot which consists of two skerries is not in any way contiguous with the Macclesfield but the Chinese insists that they are one chain of geographical features. The trade of the Iranūns moved back and forth along a direct eastwest line between Champā and Ḅaì (Luzon), bypassing Zhongsha area 中沙群島 or Macclesfields Banks.

Epitomized as "barbarians" in Chinese writings, the Iranūns were one of the few groups who accustomed themselves to sailing in and out of the constellation of rocks, islets and shoals of the Champā Sea that are dangerous to unwieldly structured boats. With their all-weather lashed-lug boats, they were the early Austronesians who instinctively mapped the routes around Southeast Asia, whose knowledge they passed to their descendants down the millennium.

***Figure 11**: Ancient Butuan boat at the National Museum of the Philippines. (Photo: NMP Manila).*

The name Panacot is native but is rarely used nowadays to refer to the Scarborough Shoal. More popular are the names: Bajo de Masinloc, Panatag, or, in the case of the Chinese, Huangyan. What is the meaning of the un-hispanized spelling 'Panakot'? Some people in Luzon I had referred it to speculated that its root word is takot, meaning "fear'. Antonio Carpio stated that '"Panacot" is the Tagalog word for threat or danger'.[50] But this is inaccurate. It was from the 'pirates' Iranūn from whom the Jesuits originally picked up the name of the island. Panakot is drawn from the root word 'sakot' (سكوة), meaning 'offer' or 'to offer'. Panakot (فناكوة) means 'offering', and the long name is *panakot sa déwata*.

Panakot sa déwata in Iranūn means offering to the Gods. This is a practice of 'feeding the Gods' to bestow bounty and safe-passage for the seafarers. The Iranūn, like the Bugis with whom they had a tight kinship and ventures in trading and raiding had an elaborate ritual on the sea. Along with their *adimat* (agimat), the merchant Iranūns sported *pilandok* (freeze dried seahorse) on tongs hanging from their necks as charm for good luck in their trade. The Bugis had the mappanré déwata, 'feeding the gods', whereby a *sanro* (on-board ritual specialist) performs a ritual in behalf of the crew. Designating barren spots to perform the offering is an old practice with the Iranūn.

The long-ranging Iranūn had various scattered sites which they use for their rituals. Another place of offerings to the gods were at Siroan (old name of Naso), near Potol

[50] Historical Truth and Lies, Scarborough Shoal in Ancient Maps, A Cartographic Exhibit Based on the 06 June 2014 Lecture of Supreme Court Senior Justice Antonio T. Carpio

in Panai where plates and earthenware were laid by these seafarers. This practice since time immemorial cost the Iranūn of the south so dearly when the Spaniards took advantage of it. In 1635, after an extremely successful raid on the Vizayas and Luzon, Datu Tagal and his boats laden heavy with booty was on its final leg on Teluk Illana heading to Picong. At the protestation of his *nakhoda* (captain), he disregarded an early advice by kecil Kudarat to eschew the ritual at Panāän so as not to make their route predictable to the enemy. The Spaniards who had come to know of the ritual significance of shooting arrows on the promontory jutting between La Caldera and Rio Grande had named it *Punta de Flechas*. But having a windfall, Tagal felt invincible and could not resist paying homage to the deity Ḅai Gawhaněn[51] as his forebears had done and tarried there to which the Spaniards surprised him and pounced on his boats.[52]

As it is, the two skerries of Panakot were twin shrines, grottos, of the early Iranūns in performing their ritual to the Dewata as although some of them had become nominal Muslims, they practiced religious syncretism, combining ancient practices with Buddhism and Islam.

History Deception 101: Manufacturing seeds of endearment

The sheer wealth of Chinese sources on history is tremendous that it could easily overwhelm the unwary. Apparently, one could not write a history of Asia by nixing Chinese writings, and the writing of Philippine history is no exception and indeed makes profuse use of Chinese sources to anchor the narratives. For instance, records of the Song and Ming periods are largely used to provide context on the history of pre-colonial Philippines.[53]

But herein lies the rub: seeds of deceptions are easily slipped in. Mesmerized readers who are overwhelmed by the details tend to accept everything thrown at them at face value, for besides having no wherewithal to untangle it, one has scarce alternative source to check them against. We are not talking about the obfuscation that ensues as

[51] Ḅai Gawhaněn, as patron of seamen, is the local embodiment of Baiyi Guanyin, the Chinese manifestation of the Tara, in turn the female manifestation of Avalokiteśvar. With Iranūn's penchant to take unorthodox routes, she guided their sailors in dark storms with her light orbs. This is the phenomenon known as Saint Elmo's fire. The Iranūn hold elaborate ritual to the bodhisattva before and after a long voyage for trade or expedition.

[52] This promontory had been known to the Spaniards as far back as 1604. Father Pedro Chirino had written on it in Relacion de Las Islas Filipinas. Chirino, Pedro, Relacion de Las Islas Filipinas (1604). Translation by Frederic W. Morrison, of Harvard University, and Emma Helen Blair.

[53] Wang Zhenping, "Reading Song-Ming Records on the Pre-colonial History of the Philippines" An early version of this paper was presented to the International Convention for Asia Scholars, 19-22 August, 2003, Singapore

a result of "compilers" observing other countries "from a Chinese worldview".[54] It is more sinister than that.

One "victim" of this is Victor N. Arches II who wrote an impassioned article "It belongs to China" in the *Manila Standard Today* on April 28, 2012. The gist of Arches' article is that based on the older Chinese map as early as 1279 in contrast to the one being used by the Department of Foreign Affairs drawn up in 1820, China has a better claim on Scarborough Shoal. Also, during the Yuan dynasty, Chinese fishermen had been to the area.

Instantly, the article, in whole or in part, had been reproduced in dozens of print and online publications all over China with an invariable preamble "Even Filipino admits Huangyan Island belongs to China!" One curious writer, Rodel Rodis, wrote in Philippine Daily Inquirer[55] that the true identity of "Victor N. Arches II" was nowhere to be found. Apparently, he was featured as a real person in CRIonline (Radio Antarabangsa China) in Malaysia. He was interviewed as saying, "I'm not afraid of the government [i.e., Philippines] because there are facts that support my position. I'm just presenting those facts". [56] Apparently, Arches suspects that the Philippine government is after him, trying to lend credence to his article by portraying himself somewhat as being hunted. Not only that: he wanted to create the impression that he found his 'evidence' independently. What Rodis found out however was that "the style and substance of the article…was uncannily similar to the way Chinese articles have dealt with the subject". The come-on employed by Arches to bring the Philippines to negotiate with China is standard fare in official Chinese press releases.

Arches' article tiptoed the contention of the Chinese government and legal scholars that Philippiine claim on Scraborough Shoal as "extremely recent".[57]

Consider his opening paragraph:

> The Scarborough Shoal does belong to China which discovered it and drew it in a map as early as 1279 during the Yuan Dynasty. Chinese fishermen, from both the Mainland and Taiwan, have since used it. As a matter of fact, Guo Shoujing, (the Chinese astronomer, engineer and mathematician who worked under the Mongol ruler, Kublai Khan) performed surveying of the South China

[54] *Ibid*
[55] <https://globalnation.inquirer.net/37081/china%E2%80%99s-propaganda-war>
[56] <http://malay.cri.cn/901/2012/05/10/101s130677.htm>
[57] François-Xavier Bonnet, "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal," 10.

> Sea, and the surveying point was the Scarborough Shoal which is considered part of the Zhongsha Islands (renamed Huangyan Island in 1983). By contrast, the "old maps" being relied upon by our Department of Foreign Affairs in its spurious claim on the same territory were drawn up only in 1820, or 541 years after China's.

Filipinos can easily be bamboozled by a propaganda like this. Let's dismantle this lemon of a paragraph for what it is worth:

China discovered Panakot before the Filipinos could do themselves

China "discovered" Panakot (Scarborough Shoals) before the Filipinos did, based on map comparisons: 1279 vs. 1820, a difference of 541 years. Really? First Filipinos came knocking on China before China came to the Philippines. So, if the Austronesian Filipinos could reach as far as Maui and all far-flung islands in the Pacific, how could they miss Panakot, a mere stone throw from Palauig, Zambales on Luzon island, and then be oblivious of it all along through the millenniums? Fact is, the Scarborough Shoal is 400 nautical miles closer to the Philippines than to China.

> First is awareness that from late prehistoric times until into the second millennium AD, the great navigators in the region were neither Indians nor Chinese, but Southeast Asians, in particular those belonging to the Austronesian language family, whose distribution from Taiwan to the Philippines and Indonesia and from the Pacific Ocean (Polynesia) to Madagascar proves their seagoing skills.[58]

Guo Shoujing surveyed Scarborough Shoal for the Chinese

Guo Shoujing, the Chinese astronomer, engineer and mathematician surveyed Scarborough as one belonging to the Chinese.

Arches took pains to portray his Gu Shoujing as a scientist. His name is actually Pu Shou-geng, a Sinicized Muslim Arab merchant and a turncoat to the Mongols that is why he was hated by the Chinese themselves.

[58] Michael Vickery, *A critical review of the sources for the history of Angkor and Champā*. International Institute for Asian Studies

Since Pu Shou-geng's survey is being used ad nauseam as bedrock evidence by the Chinese in its claim on the islets and shoals of the SCS, it becomes necessary to establish the context in which he made his survey. In various White Papers, China has been using over and over again his personality as argument to the Paracel in its conflict with Vietnam and it is now being extended to her to claim on the Scarborough against the Philippines.

The Mongol conquerors depended heavily on Muslims to fill the role of intermediaries between themselves and the Chinese population. As such, Muslims served high posts.[59] The 'Pu' is indicative of the Arabic 'Abu'. Pu Shou-geng's specialty is handling foreign affairs of foreign merchants. He and his family had amassed so much wealth, and as merchants and moneymen, they were regarded as greedy and duplicitous, cruel and hypo critical.[60]

At the outset, trade was the main draw for the Muslim settlements in southeast China. The defection of Pu Shou-geng (also P'u Shou-keng) in late 1276 was critical to the Mongols as it instantly offered them a naval force, they having no true navy of their own. Just two years before, in 1274, their expeditions against Japan ended disastrously. In return, Pu Shou-geng was appointed as supervisor of maritime trade for Kwangtung and Fukien (*Tu t'i-chü Fu-chien Kuang-tung shih-po shih* and investing him-with the title of left vice- minister (*chmg-shu tso-ch'eng*) of Fukien.[61]

Given this context, did Pu Shou-geng himself made a trip to Paracel Islands let alone Scarborough Shoal? No. What he did was only approximate the geographical coordinate of the southeasternmost point of Zhu Ya. The fact that Zhu Ya was Hainan and not in the Paracel Islands or Scarborough limits the historical sovereignty of China.[62]

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[59] Robert Finlay, "The Voyages of Zheng He: Ideology, State Power, and Maritime Trade in Ming China", Journal compilation 2008, The Historical Society and Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 333

[60] Morris Rossabi, "The Muslims in the Early Yuan Dynasty," in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. John D. Langlois (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 259, 271; and *Kubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 123; Raphael Israeli, *Muslims in China: A Study in Cultural Configuration* (London: Curzon Press, 1980), 4–5. Also, see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners, 1200–1260," Asia Major 2 (1989): 83–126.

[61] Morris Rossabe, 275; Kuwabara Jitsuzo, "On P'u Shou-keng," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 7 (1935), pp. 58-60.

[62] François-Xavier Bonnet, "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal". "The astronomer measured the geographical coordinates of 27 places. The easternmost point was in Korea; the westernmost was in Yu Nan; the southeasternmost was in Zhu Ya (Hainan); and the northeasternmost was in Tie Le (north of Mongolia, in Siberia)".

Fishing is a state act

Fishing as indication of ownership.

The Chinese made increasing use of distant fishing for geopolitical purposes.[63] Coupled with naming the islands and the reefs, as fishermen must do for their own reference, they consider it sufficient proof of ownership. The much touted *Geng Lu Bu* (Manual of Sea Routes), their so-called fisherman's Bible "provides conclusively iron-clad evidence that China is the country to develop and operate on South China islands".[64] And, "It is the legal principle and basis for China's right to defend the South China Sea". But the truth is that compared with the activities of the Iranūn along the Spratly Islands as elucidated in this monograph, Chinese fishing does not hold a candle. As internationally acknowledged, seasonal fishing camps and intermittent commercial guano mining do not qualify as occupation, at least not by a state. The presence of itinerant fishermen including the Philippines would be insufficient to establish any legal ownership.

And we're not about to see the last of this type of deception and propaganda. This is an ongoing process being foisted to a gullible online audience — especially Filipinos.

[63] Giorgio Cuscito, "Geopolitics and food security: why China goes fishing", 27 August 2021, From <https://www.foodandmigration.com/geopolitics-and-food-security-why-china-goes-fishing/>
[64] From <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=707218512752195>

CHAPTER 6
ḌAÌ SA CONDOR باءِ ساكوندور (CÔN SƠN): HISTORICAL DISCONNECT OF THE NINE DASHED-LINE

When China drew its Nine-Dashed Line it studiously give wide berth to Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn). It is unlike its eastern dashes which so closely insinuate into the coastline of Palawan فَلَوَن. Analyzing how the Iranūn had taken hold of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور for a long time gives us a hint on why the Chinese eschewed it in plotting their so-called sovereign claims of 1947.

It is rather queer that while China has lassoed the Spratlys inside its Nine-Dashed line, it has eschewed Pulo Condor فولوكُندور given that it had no traceable activity in the Spratlys, while at least there were flat-bottomed Chinese boats that passed by Pulo Condor فولوكُندور following the traditional coast-hugging west route round Champā and Cambodia. In fact, Admiral Zeng He never missed passing by Pulo Condor فولوكُندور in all his voyages in the 15th century. So if the Chinese had drawn so wide its so-called Nine-Dashed Line, they could not miss Pulo Condor فولوكُندور as well. To the Iranūn seafarers, this would be a fatal disconnect in their network!



***Figure 12**: A historical disconnect of the Nine-Dashed Line. The area in transparent green are connected by a Southeast Asian network in history.*
Putting them outside the lasso of the Chinese Nine-Dashed Line is sheer ignorance of the historical dimension of the Spratlys Island and the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

Around near the end of the 16th century, the trader Radyâ sa Pulo Condor فولوكُندور had more or less permanently established a trading base in Pāṇḍuraṅga in joint venture with Iranūn *nakhodas* based in Mindoro for their overseas trade. The main village was called Campong Kerbu. They were given a free lease of the main island provided they control the piracy around the area.

Then, in 1693 a political change swept over the mainland when the Nguy˜ên Lords had emerged victorious in their war against the Kingdom of Champā. Five years later in 1698, a large swath of Cambodian territory north of the Bassac River in the Mekong Delta fell into the hands of the Nguyen. The area annexed included Gia Dinh and Saigon. This would mean that the inhabitants of Pulu Condor had to submit themselves to the new overlords or leave.

Pulo Condor فولوكُندور is an island situated off the southern coast of Cambodia and Vietnam. It is vital to the Philippines' claim on the Spratlys because it is intrinsic to the Iranūn's activity in the South China Sea then. To them — as will transpire — Pulo Condor فولوكُندور is an inextricable node of their network that connects mainland Southeast Asia to Borneo, the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia.

Figure 13. Pulo Condor as shown in the Abraham Ortelius map, 1570.

In numerous *salsilah* of the Maranao-Iranūn *kirim* scripts, the key figure here is the Iranūn-Bugis Princess Mabay sa Condor. She is invariably referred to in Teluk Illana as 'Bạì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور' (باءِ ساكوندور).[65] The Champā principalities (kampong كمفوڠ كمفوڠ) that ran north to south of the spine of what is now modern Vietnam had gradually over the centuries "became unified through a complex system of kinship and marital alliances. As speakers of an Austronesian language, the Cham were entirely distinct from their Vietnamese neighbors on the eastern littoral of mainland Southeast Asia."[66] The process found its apogee at Pāṇḍuraṅga when yet for another

[65] In Teluk Illana, she is known as Wulanḅài sa Têbuk. Genealogy ref.: Anta sa Tŭboc Gugudan in Gugudan ko Mala a Bangsa by Baí Macabaí (Hadja Zohra) Mangandog. Dozonan Gugudan by Hadjah Zaki Indar (from old manuscript); Salsila sa Ganassi (21 ka Lokês) by Moh'd. Taib Sarip ko Maruhom Adil sa Ganassi

[66] Gunn, Geoffrey C., History Without Borders: The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000-1800 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011

push south, the Đại Việt were able to unseat Champā at its central capital in Vijaya forcing it to move its capital to the south.

Mabay sa Condor مَباءِ ساكوندور was a daughter of Inche Kamad {Ungkaya Kŭmad} sa Maluso[67] [c. 1612-] and Pinorot فِنورُت (Pinorong) {Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور}. Inche Kamad was reputed to be a grandson of Radyâ Tokay (Tokayan). Tokay was the redoubtable Chinese pirate Lin Daoquian (林道乾) from Teochew (Chaozhou) in eastern Guangdong (Canton). The Spaniards called him Vintoquián, drawn from his Bugis-Iranūn endearment Tokayan (توكَيَن).

For decades, the Chinese authorities had placed a bounty on Lin Daoqian's head. Yu Dayou of the Chinese navy chased him out of the China coast. Lin sought refuge in the Penghu islands where the Lŭtao Iranūn merchants were traditionally based in their trade (and smuggling) with the southeastern coast of China. Yu again drove Lin out of the Penghu-Leihtao islands. This resulted in the uprooting of the Lŭtao-Iranūn base for good that led them scampering to other places. In the reign of the Wanli Emperor (1572-1620), Chinese settlers colonized the Penghu-Leihtao. Some of the displaced Lŭtao-Iranūn joined Lin in Beigang, mainland of Taiwan (Tayawan or Tatayawan in Iranūn) to become full-fledged wokou where Lin regrouped. Lin's polyglot forces swelled considerably to 5,000 fighting men consisting of Chinese, Japanese, Cham, Bugis and Lŭtao-Iranūn.

In 1571, Lin Daoqian attacked Shenquan and in the following year 1572, sailed to Chenghai, both on the Guangdong coast, where he was defeated by Li You (李佑) (General Liu Yaohui). He then fled to Luzon in 1573 where he established a fortified trading base. But then a further setback occurred when a rival pirate chief operating on the South China Sea, Lin Feng, captured 55 of his ships.

Lin Feng is the legendary Limahong (Limaūng in Iranūn) who was soon to invade Luzon in 1574 in tandem with a local uprising in Manila against the Spaniards. Perhaps, Raja Tokayan (Lin Daoqian) had the same intention of ultimately ousting the Spaniards from Lucon and make himself king. At the time the Spaniards were vulnerable as they had not as yet consolidated their hold on Luzon. But the loss of his ships to Limahong doomed his plan. This depleted Lin Daoqian's forces as he only managed to escape with five ships.[68] Finding his fortune dwindling, he found sanctuary among the *Orangkayas* in Pāṇḍuraṅga, the southernmost kingdom of Champā where there was a preponderance of Lŭtao Iranūn *Orang Laut*.

[67] Maluso is southwest of Basilan بَسيلَن

[68] Juan Gonzlez de Mendoza, The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China and the Situation Thereof, Vol. II, ed. George T. Staunton, trans. R. Parke (New York, Burt Franklin, 1854) p.7

At Pāṇḍuraṅga[69], Radyậ Tokay (Tokayan) married a daughter of Orangkaya Pandara. He then settled his new family in Pulo Condor فولوكُندور in 1574. A year after, a son was born who was to be known as Ŏngkaya Encik sa Maluso (southwest of Basilan بَسيلَن). It seemed that Lin Daoqian had not quite mellowed yet as in the fall of 1578, he was at it again, pirating and trading along the southern coast of China. Later, he left his young family at Pulau Condor to venture westward to Pattani (Southern Thailand) where after some adventures and misadventures, he eventually died and was buried in Kubo Bukit Cina.

At the turn of the 17th century, although the Spaniards were progressing well on their colonial expansion in the Philippines, they were woefully oblivious of the overseas activities of the Iranūn over the 'zone' of the South China Sea (to borrow a term of James Francis Warren[70]). Naturally, all their documentations and writings, through and through, are all about the administration of the Spanish possessions from Nueva España (Mexico) and the systematic 'reduccion' of the settlements of the Indios by the friars. The Galleon ships had been iconic, but the only Indio's attachment to it is their being made to toil in the shipyards or their resistance to it. As for the 'pirate' Moro, it is all about the topos of destruction brought by their raids. There has not been a sincere effort to get a handle of the dynamics of the age. These narratives about 'piracy' are swabbed in to make up for the absence of details. Read any Philippine textbook, and you will find that after being ushered in to a few pages of pre-colonial history, and just when your appetite is growing, you are served with a monotonous stretch of over 300 years of domination and exploitation of the natives to serve the ends of a king that lived on the other side of the globe who only maintains a modicum of correspondence. Unfortunately, even budding Moro writers cultivate the same mistake that they end up invariably telescoping the history of their ancestors.

This blissful disconnect led historians to develop the idea that Philippines' history belongs to Latin America! As Isaac Donoso of Universidad de Alicante wrote in *Morología: el Malayismo y la Escuela española de estudios sobre Mindanao y Joló*:

> Indeed, the history of the Philippines runs along a different path from the rest of the Malay world from the 16th century, when, due to contact with Western

[69] Pŭndurangan or Pandara in Iranūn

[70] Warren were one of the earliest Southeast Asian writers who "abandoned the insular geographic perspective of earlier historians of the Philippines, Indonesia and Borneo, for a more dynamic definition of the Sulu Sultanate's boundaries based on larger scale processes of social change and a borderless history of a wide-ranging maritime trading network oriented toward China, Singapore and Europe." See Warren, James Francis, "Looking Back on "The Sulu Zone": *State Formation, Slave Raiding and Ethnic Diversity in Southeast Asia", Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 69, No. 1 (270)*(1996), pp. 21-33

> culture, much of the archipelago adopted Catholicism as a religion and many Hispanic cultural uses, including Castilian language. Toynbee claimed that the Philippines belonged to the western world that stretched from Madrid to Manila through Mexico.

In fact maps were developed espousing just this view.

Today, we continue to espouse this view that we are just another *chicharon*-munching Caribbean country, a colonialist's creation strangely grafted along the maritime silk road of Asia. This finds ultimate expression in our art, culture, and in conceptualizing our tourism promotions, which would rather bring the distantly idyllic but insipid Ifugao life to the fore — never given to the enterprising Iranūn that slice-sluice the sea with their *praus*. This strange approach in presenting ourselves to the world we affirm as our innate 'uniqueness' from the rest of Southeast Asia. This perceived 'uniqueness' is promoted by quasi-official historians of the Philippines served as textbooks in secondary schools for the consumption of our children in their tender years. And our 'submission' to the colonialists is repackaged in the euphemistic 'hospitality' of the native.



***Figure 14**: Descripcion De Las Yndias Ocidentales by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Madrid/1601 (1726).*
Scarce 1726 edition of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas' general map of America, the Pacific Ocean and the Eastern part of Asia, from his Descripción de las Indias Ocidentales, first published as part of his important Historia general in Madrid in 1601.

It is this sort of impression that led China to be aggressive in posturing their historical 'sovereign' right, however ambiguously laid out. To dispel any doubt to whom the unbroken mastery, usage, and provenance of the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals belongs, a genealogic treatment of the Iranūn lineage is in order as it is critical in bringing to light the dynamics of their network affecting the South China Sea.

The Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور married into the house of the Amatunding ā Nuni [c. 1596-1666]. Amatunding was better known to the Spanish as 'Marunding' in their account. He took care of the defense of the coastal lines of southwest Mindanao under Cachil Corralat (Kudarat) based in Simouay. He was the son of Ŭṃbūrung Damagāyug {Radyâ Muda Borongan sa Magindanao} [c.1579-1637] (Datu Borongan to the Spaniards).

Ŭṃbūrung was the son of Dimasangkáy ā Adil, the Datu of Magindanao [c. 1546-1596]. Ŭṃbūrung was the Radyâ Muda (heir-apparent) of Kapitan Laut Buisan. Buisan had replaced Datu Sali {Gūgū Sarikula} as Datu of Magindanao who in turn had earlier succeeded Dimasangkáy. As had been agreed between Râja Śirūngan of Buayaan [c. 1564-1626] and Buisan, Ŭṃbūrung was the next-in-line to the throne. But Ŭṃbūrung did not cultivate much closeness with Buisan. He was always seen in the court of Śirūngan and joined him in his many raids. When Buisan died in 1619, the Bichara Attas disregarded the covenant and awarded the kingship to Kudarat. However, Kudarat could not let go of the support of the Iranūn at Tebouk تُبوك and their overseas trade network. To remedy the situation, he had his youngest sister, Mupāt Gāyang مَوفاةغايَغْ {Baÿalabi ā Mumbau} married to Amatunding ā Nuni, a son of Ŭṃbūrung.

Under successive rulers of Magindanao and Sulu, brisk trade between the southern Philippines with Champā, Cambodia, Siam and Burma had flourished for centuries. Even during the pre-colonial times, when China had been restricting trades, the Lŭtao-Iranūn had been serving a shadow economy by clandestine trade with the coastal people along the Taiwan Strait.

The southern part of the country had maintained its independence from colonial Spain. In hindsight, their polities had insulated themselves from all the administration of the central government in Manila, which allowed them to trade freely with other regions in Southeast Asia and bring goods in and out of China. The independence of the Muslim sultanates is delineated in the much-touted 1734 Velarde Map itself:

> An interesting note on the banderole [of the Velarde map] that stretches across the channel between Mindanao and Bohol Islands (*Desde Samboangan hasta Caraga por el norte es de España*) makes a clear acknowledgment of the existence of an internal frontier, testifying that Spanish control did not extend to the Muslim sultanates in the south of Mindanao."[71]

[71] Altić, Mirela, *Jesuit Contribution to the Mapping of the Philippine Islands: A Case of the 1734 Pedro Murillo Velarde's Chart* https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90406-1_5 Published Online: 2018-06-28 Published Print: 2019. p. 79

BOJOL
ISLA DE MINDANAO
Ptª d Sultanes
Panaon
Talaxagono
Ohot
Hibon
Tago
Limpan
O. Bruxo
Tandag
Marihutag
Liangá
Banculin
Hinatuan
Bislig
Catel
Caramoan
Camiguin
Talisay
Enzenada de Pangil
Ptª d Diuisa
Ptª d Pinagbaan
Ptª d Sipalay
Ptª d Tagolo
Ptª d Banuyo
Ptª d Caimo
Ptª d Lagdo
Ptª d Bagayo
Ptª d Sipaquil
Ptª d Fuego
Ptª d Dumaguete
Ptª d Tagolo
Ptª d Tagbilaran
Ptª d Pilar
Ptª d Tubigon
Ptª d Bantayan
Ptª d Cebu
Ptª d Mactan
Ptª d Bohol
Ptª d Sogod
Ptª d Panaon
Ptª d Limasaua
Ptª d Leyte
Ptª d Tacloban
Ptª d Dinagat
Ptª d Surigao
Ptª d Caraga por el Norte es de España
Ptª d Diuisa
Ptª d Lampon
Ptª d Siargao
Ptª d Caraga
Ptª d Manay
Ptª d Sarangani
Ptª d Balut
Ptª d Sibuguey
Ptª d Tagolo
Ptª d Dapitan
Ptª d Sibutu
Ptª d Tawi Tawi
Ptª d Basilan
Ptª d Zamboanga
Ptª d Caldera
Ptª d Tagolo
Ptª d Sibuguey

seas. A hallmark of the Vilarde map is how it had labelled the places using native names making it a valuable source for a history of the archipelago. Note how the cartographers used the old Iranūn-Bajao name Samboangan (سَمبواغان) for Zamboanga, the same is true for Panakot (فناكوة).

The Two Houses of Tebouk تْبوك and Pandara

Gāyang and the Amatunding sired five children collectively known as 'nuni'[73]: Anta sa Tebouk تْبوك, Nagŏ {Mama sa Picong} {Kapêtan Laut}, Ŭmbūn sa Balabagan, Patawŭ {Paramāta Āsiya sa Butig} and Pindawa-dawa Oray[74] sa Maçiu.


Alauddin Shah (Aluyŭdan sa Sulūg) {Mardia Tuan}
Nandaopan sa Sulūg (Putrí Mabaya) [Pagariyungan]
Pinorot (Pinorong) {Bai sa Condor}
Radyâ Tokay (Tokayan) Lín Dàoqián (Vintoquián)
Putrí Bugis sa Pandara Pundurangan (Phan Rang)
Inche Ŏnkaya {Encik Chuanzhu sa Condor}
Inche Kamad sa Maluso {Ungkaya Kūmad} [c. 1612-]
Bini Pulau Condor {Apoō Dakŭnŭg} [c. 1623-]
Mabay sa Condor {Wulanbai sa Têbuk} [c. 1640-, Côn Sơn]
Anta (Pangantâan) sa Têbuk [c.1635-,]
Putrí Noway
Maradia Palawan sa Minitŭpad {Datu sa Picong} {Saber sa Têbuk}
Barassí (Datu Bulasse) {Sultan sa Têbuk ika-1} c. 1687-
Putrí Nayo c. 1682-
Danggaū {Sultan sa Butig ika-1} r. 1675-?

***Figure 16**: Ancestry of the Mabay sa Condor. The appellation 'Pagariyungan' is a signal of one's ancestry being attached to the court of the Majapahit Empire*

[73] To be descended from the nunis, according the genealogist and the orators of the Darangen, is a mark of nobility.
[74] Najib Saleeby's Manuscript erred for counting Pindaw as another child of the couple. Pindaw is just a short name for Pindawa-dawa Oray.



***Figure 17**: The House of Amatunding a Nuni and ancestry*

It was Anta sa Tebouk تُبوك [c.1635] who was betrothed to Mabay sa Condor [c.1657] of Champā. Anta sa Tebouk تُبوك was born some seven years before the treaty of Kudarat and the Spaniards came to be signed in 1642. But in January 1658, Captain Francisco de Esteybar, the Spanish governor of the Moluccas, was directed to capture Kudarat's capital in Maguindanao. To soften resistance, the Spaniards first sent an expeditionary force to Butig to preempt Amatunding a Nuni's reinforcement. Though the Spaniards managed to burn rice fields and destroyed many vessels[75], they failed to capture the Amatunding. They retired and attacked the settlements around Sabanilla.[76]

The failed invasion of Esteybar and later the abandonment of the presidio of Zamboanga on January 4, 1663 ushered an unprecedented prosperity for Magindanao and the Iranūn along the Illana Bay. Merchant and traders from Cathay, Mellayu, Champā, and Khmer returned in droves bringing silks, cotton, fabric, gold silver and iron, lacquer-ware and chests of fragrant teas. They took away rice, beeswax, tobacco, spices, pearls and ornaments of mother-of-pearl and shells. Anta grew up to become a young country trader then. His trips brought him to Champā, Java, Malacca, and Johor, and Ternate, and other entreports.

Figure 18: *A sample page from a kirim script.*
From a salsilah featuring the descendants of Dadaw (Pindawa-dawa Oray (daughter of Amatunding ā Nūni and Mupāt Gāyang {Bayālabi ā Mumbau} and Balindong

[75] Jose Cuevas, Cotabato: Historical Brief, 1596-1860. This article was translated from Spanish to English and published by J. Sutherland, Associate Editor, of Mindanao Herald, dated February 3, 1909, pp. 16-17
[76] Majul, p.179

Bésar (Sarikran). Photo courtesy: Jamarul Sharief Musa, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur, Philippines.

Though Anta sometimes, ventured using the traditional coast-hugging route to access the China market, his forte was the more straightforward unorthodox route Champā. Some Iranūns of Champā not attached to the Javanese ports do not cater to the larger markets of Chinese, Arabic, and European but to the outlying regions of Southeast Asia.

> As much of the Chinese, Arabic, and European oceangoing trade converged on Java to take advantage of its spice monopolies in the Moluccas, outlying regions did not necessarily deal directly with these foreign merchants as consistently. Instead, they would have acquired prestige goods like Indian textiles, iron, and porcelains through different intermediary groups, often ethnic minorities like the Orang Laut or Chinese.[77]

The long-standing hold of the Iranūn on Pulo Condor فولوكُندور began to be disturbed when Chams' grip on Central Champā began to unravel. Sensing this trend, Nago sa Picong, the only brother of Uncaya Anta, persuaded him to shift the weight of his operation along Teluk Illana, especially after their father, the Amatunding had passed away. The need became acute when the redoubtable Kudarat himself died in 1671. A great power vacuum had ensued.

Kudarat had outlived his son Dundang Tiduray, who died a year earlier than him. So the sultanate passed directly to his grandson Barahamān [r. 1671-1699]. After Kudarat, the Iranūn carved their own Sultanate in the highlands of Butig though many Iranūn were still beholden to the Magindanao Sultanate. The Sama, Badjaus, Lŭtaos and Malukans especially the Dumatos of Jailolo who had made Magindanao their home gave their fealty to the young sultan and had chosen to stay, while others who led an independent existence had eventually left, looking for greener pastures. Barahamān was weak, always dominated by his shrewder and scheming, brother Kahāruddīn Kuda (Qudāh Maulano) {Sultan sa Maguindanao [r.1699-1702]}. But the Magindanao was on honeymoon under Barahamān. The key entrepôt at Pulangi directed by Chinese, Arab, Iranūn nakhodas and other entrepreneurs assured the flowering of the kingdom. It witnessed the most unprecedented growth in the history of Magindanao, thanks to the abandonment of the Spanish garrison at Sambuangan سَمبُوَغن at the

[77] 12 Foster 1978:3-22. David Gowey, The problem of the Visayas in Southeast Asian History and Historiography, Arizona State University, p.10.

protest of the Jesuits. The threat of the dreaded Koxinga compelled the Spanish to concentrate all its forces in Manila.

The Iranūn was not deluded into thinking that they had seen the last of the Spaniards in Mindanao. When the couple Anta and Mabay sa Condor settled in Tebouk تُبوك, they brought along with them the créme de la créme of their amphibian warriors. Tebouk تُبوك became a shipyard for construction, repairs and maintenance of high-seas voyaging ships. The ports teemed with garays, padaos, and other seagoing vessels.

Together with the heirs of Anta's brother-in-law, Balindong Bésar (husband of Pindawadawa Oray), the Iranūn controlled the activities along the northern coast of Mindanao at Panguil Bay. Balindong Bésar held the highland of Basak at Taraca. Basak was a rice plain kingdom that hosted the most numbers of warriors in Mindanao. It seemed that the Iranūn were destined to have its golden age as their economy grew.

Then the Spaniards came back to Sambuangan سَمبُوَغن, and this time they were determined to stay for good. At the time the lord of Têbouk was Barassí {Sultan sa Têbouk ika-1} [c.1687-][78]. He is a son of Mabay sa Condor and Anta. He is the misnamed Datu Bulasse sa Bulig in the plate at the Fort del Pilar of Zamboanga. In Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, he was referred to as Meradja Bulassi in Tubok, Datu of Pikong but at the time the lord of Pikong was his brother Maradia Palawan فَلَوَن sa Minitŭpad, who had succeeded his uncle Nago sa Datu sa Pikong. Obviously the 'R-L shift' in pronunciation means the Dutch source emanated from a Magindanao informant.

The Sultan sa Têbouk Barassí was named by his parents after Kyai Chili Baressi {Jogugu 1676} of Tidore. Baressi, son of Sultan al-Hamza Hajah Amir ul-Mu'minin Barfi ul-Alam Illahi Shah Musalih un-Nasir ud-din ibni al-Marhum Kyai Chili Tolu Suki (1627 – 1648).[79] During the Spanish occupation of Ternate, there was much collaboration and coordination between Maluku and the Iranūn principality of Tebouk تُبوك against the Spaniards. Anta and Mabay sa Condor were occasional guest at the court of Maluku.

According to Thomas Forrest, who spent eight months (5 May 1775 to 8 January 1776) on the Illana Bay, inland Lanao had about 61,300 inhabitants.[80] But this was ten years after the explosion of Mt. Magatori (Makaturing) in 1765. This was when as much as

[78] See Genealogy chart

[79] Manse, Maarten, Rulers in Asia (1683 – 1745): a preliminary study of the chronology of their reign.

[80] Forrest, Thomas, *A voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas 1774-1776*, 2nd ed. with plates. London, 1780..

three-fourth of the able-bodied population had fanned out to various points in Southeast Asia, looking for a new life or livelihood to support their folks at home.

The eruption of Makaturing defaced the agricultural and the maritime industry of Southwestern Mindanao. Generations of painstakingly laid structures got buried under sands as lavas overflowed into rice paddies and columns of thick clouds of gas engulfed the Maranao towns that dotted the circuit of the lake. The devastation was total. The event is talked about even to this day. In fact, titles known as Datu sa Pŭṭṭád (Sand King) and Bai sa Pŭṭṭád (Sand Queen) in Maçiu among the progenies of Ňdango (Poönā Maçiu) {Měrhoum Radyâ Śālic}, the eldest son of Balindong Bésar, had been established as a memento of the destruction.[81] Until today, places in Maçiu are still being quarried for the enormous deposits of sand in the area. The event forever altered the history and the outlook of the Iranūn in Southeast Asia.

During Thomas Forrest's visit to Mindanao, he had the opportunity to study up-close the Magindanao court. His trip overall had been fruitful as he had even coaxed Fakih Maulana to hand-sketch and account the riverine settlements (*nigeri*) of Pulangi. Forrest lamented his failure to trek into inland Lanao. What information he got were all second-hand:

> Had I known this part of the island so civilized, as I found it afterwards ; I mean with regard to safety in travelling from place to place, at least to the Great Lano, the banks of which are full of people, and the road from Tubug well frequented: I should certainly have visited that lake…[82]*

Today, Lanao has more than a million inhabitants, all answering to being descended from the Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور and claiming as heirs to the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals. Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور descended into a derivative title Ḅaì Labogandang. As per practice, it is, along with the title Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور, assumed by the female progenies of Mabay sa Condor through his son Danggaū who reigned as Sultan sa Butig in 1675. There was Ḅaì Labogandang {Bayālabi sa Butig} [c.1820-], a seventh generation descendant. Another was Angandi {Ḅaì Labogandang} [c. 1801-], another seventh generation descendant. Also, there was another Ḅaì Labogandang, a daughter of Měrhoum Pongkay Tongkiaman {Sultan sa Binidayan ika-1}, a sixth generation descendant.

[81] Genealogy reference: Datu sa Pŭṭṭád: Ŭmbūrung Gogodan by Macabaí (Hadja Zohra) Mangandog; Mangondato sa Maciu Gogodan by Somanggibo Mangondato (Bayālabi sa Maciu, Putrí Maāmur sa Poōna Maciu), and five other genealogies.
[82] Forrest, Thomas.

What binds these strings of later-generation Ḅaì Labogandang was they were directly descended through the son of Mabay sa Condor, Danggaū who reigned as Sultan sa Butig in 1675. The Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور is traditionally a coastal (pagilidan) title. When the progenies of Danggaū appropriated it in the highland of Lanao it was adapted to the more pedestrian Ḅaì a Labogandang.[83] Labogandang is just another word for Condor in memory of the island of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn) or Kundol in Tagalog, meaning the plant calabash or Wax Gourd. Another prominent one was Ḅaì Labogandang sa Oatu [c. 1830-], a granddaughter of Ḅaì sa Marigay, to which the author is descended.

In more than 800 genealogy compilations, reminiscences and interviews I have made, I was able to trace some descendants of Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور, most of whom were or are Filipino citizens. To round up our genealogy tracing, here is a sampler direct line of the late Sen. Tomas Ll. Cabili from the Bugis-Iranūn Princess:

[83] This Maranao practice can also be gleaned in other titles in use. For example, Orangkaya (Orang Kaya), which means a man of means, when used in insular Lanao had been converted to Oranggaga (Orang Gaga), both words being synonym to each other.



***Figure 19**: The 10-Generation descent of Sultan Tomas Ll. Cabili from the Ḅaì sa Condor.*

CHAPTER 7 ĐẠI VIỆT AND CHAMPĀ'S CENTURIES OF WARS

The countryside of Vietnam is adorned with ancient Cham temples and ruins the Vietnamese government is never proud of. Champā had quite prospered in those ancient times. The sandstone arches, red brick flooring, and shreds of pottery found at Tra Kieu in Quang Nam —the oldest artifacts dating to the 2nd century CE speak of a lost civilization. Cham citadels and temples still standing along Vietnam's coast beckoning to the sea are a marvel to tourists. My Son dating to the 7th and 8th centuries is delineated as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Yet the physical evidence of Cham culture is disappearing. Cham temples and tombs have been overrun by vegetation, or destroyed by quarrying. The faster they can be out of sight, the better. Champā's last capital, Song Luy, is elided in Vietnamese history books. And tourist brochures neglect to feature Vietnam's Cham roots.

No wonder despite Cham's far-advanced maritime culture than the Đại Việt — Vietnam's best bet to claim parts of the disputed islands in the South China Sea — it is never invoked by the powers that be as it would only open old wounds. Never mind that before the Portuguese had named the South China Sea, it used to be called the Champā Sea. For Vietnam, it has put all it eggs in one basket: its first expedition to the Hoang Sa (Paracel) during the time of the Nguyen Lords in the 17th century. This is the basis of what Vietnam solely claims as its historical right.[84]

But this period was already late in history reckoning. As for the Philippines, it behooves on it to pursue the development of Cham as a civilization and follow it to its eventual demise as it unlocks all the historical justification on its claim on the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal. The mere putting of markers on the islands in late modern period does not make for a sovereign claim. Activity — historical activity

[84]Todd C. Kelly, "Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago", Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 3, Fall 1999.

at that — as defined by a backdrop of the circumstance of the age is what makes for a historical claim. In their heyday, the Iranūn Orang Laut and their Rajas were the only masters of these disputed islets of the South China Sea. They had made use to their full potential the now disputed islands. Not for fishing or just plain curiosity but for their logistic network in ferrying untold numbers of Cham fleeing the onslaught of the Die Viet until the latter displaced the Chams for good.

Mainland Chams had quite a relationship with island Southeast Asia. This relationship is more or less defined by trade that generally followed the coast-hugging western route. The trade relationship, however between the Philippines and Champā runs into the expanse of the South China Sea, involving the Sparatlys.

> Several shipwrecks are evidence of trade between Champā and the Philippines via the Spratly Islands. One vessel — the Pandanan wreck, found off the Philippine island of Palawan — is believed to have left the Champā coast sometime between 1450 and 1470, carrying green-glazed ceramics made in the Cham kingdom of Vijaya.
>
> In 1997 Philippine authorities salvaged a centuries-old vessel off Thitu Island in the Spratlys containing about a thousand granite carvings that appear to have been taken from unknown Champā sites.[85]

This is the 'captured' market niche of the enterprising Iranūn who made the run down their exclusive unorthodox route. Even more dramatic though is their usage of the route for steerage of refugees or for Cham who plainly decided to look for greener pasture somewhere else. The intermittent wars between Champā and the Đại Việt of the North and the Khmers to the West also molded the relationships between Cham and island Southeast Asia.

Champā's conflict with the Đại Việt started at the end of the 10th century. The Vietnamese managed to push south to Vijaya or Vijayapura (today's Quy Nhon). Champā as it turned was less adroit in land battles. But in sea battles they were unmatched, thanks to the support of the Iranūn-Malay amphibian warriors. Their glorious naval battle is depicted by a bas reliefs in an Angkor temple in the 12th century. The Đại Việt was wise to engage Champā in land battles. Over the centuries,

[85] Adam Bray, Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China Sea Watch Maritime Dispute From Sidelines http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140616-south-china-sea-vietnam-china-cambodia-Champā/

it had been a seesaw battles between Champā and the Đại Việt. But the push south of the Đại Việt was more resolute.

In 986, the first refugees of northern Champā crossed the sea and were settled by the Chinese in the Hainan Island, where today their descendants are known as Utsuls. When the capital was at Indrapura, the refuge of choice was Hainan. Some Cham mariners sailed east to Teochew and ended up at the Fujian coast at Taiwan Strait to trade or join the wokou. At this time the Lŭtao Iranūn were also serving the second China east trade route.

As the Cham polities were edged southward, the succeeding refugees choose to move farther south to Pāṇḍuraṅga or the Khmer borders. When the Đại Việt pushed further into the last *kampong* كمفوغ (principality) of the Cham, many members of the royal court with their people had taken the classical coast-hugging trade route to of Patani and their ending up refuge in Java and the Malay Peninsula. Other exodus who could not get tickets to the royal barges roughed it out in the South China Sea the exit offered by the Lŭtao-Iranūn, i.e. Pundurangan ⇒ Condor ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن (Spratly Islands) ⇒ Palawan فَلَوَن, before they panned out to various points of Borneo, Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, Sulu and Sulawesi, and the rest of the islands.

Even as early as the first refugees, some Cham had already decided to settle overseas. When the capital retreated south to Vijaya some refugees took the trade route to Butuan via Zhambulao Island and Paracel. Butuan was an outlier of Champā. Basilan بَسيلَن, Sulu and south Sambuangan سَمبُوَغن admitted the "Dampuans" (Cham) in their midst, courtesy of the Iranūn. So much a role was played by the small islands of the South China Sea in ferrying refugees and exiles mostly through the agency of the Bugis and the Iranūn.

In 982, King Lê Hoàn of Đại Việt sent army which invaded Champā, sacked Indrapura and beheaded Champā king. Cham refugees crossed the sea to Hainan. Others had set up shops in Butuan where they already had an emporium. Ma-i (Ba-i) traders appear on the Canton coast with the Chams who fled the war. They were Lŭtao-Iranūn mistaken for Arab merchants and sometimes as Cantonese. The Chams traders were absorbed in their community. The unstable condition in Cochinchina prompted the Lŭtao-Iranūn to set up a base in the Penghu Leihtao Island on the Taiwan Strait.

The momentary lull in commerce in the central node of the west route brought by the war presented Butuan an opportunity to send an embassy for the first time to the Celestial Empire in 1001. The tribute trade were brokered by acculturated Iranūn-Cham. Butuan then was an outlier of Champā between 900 CE and 1200 CE. The route

between Butuan and Cochinchina (Central Champā) is coastal Champā ⇒Zhanbulao (Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن) ⇒ Paracel Island ⇒ Mindoro ⇒ Butuan. As Clavé-Celik wrote:

> Indeed, these two kingdoms were closely linked. The sea route to China went through the Paracel Islands and the Champā which was an essential port for the trade from the Philippines. As mentioned earlier, the Philippines and the Champā maintained exchanges since the protohistoric period.[86]

[86] Clavé-Celik, Elsa, "Islamic Epigraphy and Ancient Chinese Trade in the Philippine Archipelago", *More Islamic Than We Admit: Philippine Islamic Cultural History*, ed. Isaac Donoso (Quezon City: Vibal Publications, 2017)

***Figure 20**: Trade route via the unorthodox route of the Iranūn*

Zhambulao (占不勞山; Cù Lao Chàm) is an island off the eastern coast of Champā, which the Iranūn use as a transit point. To them it is called Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن. It is a toponym for a place one in Laguindingan and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental in

northeren Mindanao not far off from Butuan. Another Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن is in Taraka in the highlands of Lanao.[87]

The atrocities between Champā and Vietnam did not stop. In 1069, the ruler Lý Nhân Tông) ordered an attack on Vijayapura (Vijaya) to punish Champā for raiding in Vietnam. The Đại Việt burned the entire city and captured 50,000 of its citizens to be enslaved. Another round of refugees moved south or overseas. To retain Vijayapura, the defeated king Rudravarman III offered as concession Champā's three Northern provinces to Vietnam (present-day Quảng Bình and Quảng Trị provinces). [88] Vijayapura's geography was important not only as a trading port but as an agricultural base that allowed it to support a large population.

Vijayapura's enviable position as an entrepôt that arbitrates the trade between China and the west was bound to lead to trouble. Champā was also involved in wars with Angkor (now Cambodia) around the 12th and 13th centuries. Suryavarman II managed to subdue Vijayapura in 1145, deposing Indravarman III, but four years later they had to retreat in defeat.

In 1283, the Mongol-Yuan Empire looking southward to expand into Southeast Asia sent an army led by the Mongol commander Sogetu. The Mongols were beaten back, but Vijayapura was sacked.

In 1377 the Đại Việt laid a siege on Vijayapura. The Vietnamese forces were routed and the Đại Việt emperor, Trần Duệ Tông, died as a result of the battle. Thereafter Champā returned a counter-offensive. The death of the emperor was a turning point for Trần dynasty and Đại Việt. Chế Bồng Nga attacked from the north, and successfully captured the Đại Việt capital of Thăng Long.

Zainal Abidin aka Chế Bồng Nga, Po Binasuor was the last great Champā king. His reign spelled the end of the Trần dynasty in Đại Việt. To the Iranūn he was known by his appellation Sinal Abirin or Jainal (Zainal Abidin زين العابدين).

Chế Bồng Nga apparently managed to unite the Cham lands under his rule and by 1361 was strong enough to attack Vietnam from the sea. His Cham forces raided the

[87] The Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن in Taraka during the time of Sarikran Balindong Bésar[c. 1611] was named in memory of the experiences of the Lŭtao-Iranūn in Champā. Balindong Bésar married into the house of Amatunding ā Nūni. His wife Paramata Pindaw (Pindawa-dawa Oray) is a sister of Anta sa Têbuk who took Mabay sa Condor as wife. Mabay sa Condor was a Princess from Pāndara or Pāṇḍuraṅga (Ninh Thuan), the southernmost principality of Champā. There is also a Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن in Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental where a Maranao Datu Masorong Arindig [c. 1798] from Taraca was a chief. Among his wives were Premitiva Sabellita and Maxima Macala Ubarco and a certain Balacuit.

[88] Maspero, G., 2002, The Champā Kingdom, Bangkok: White Lotus Co., Ltd., ISBN 9747534991; Nguyễn Đình Đầu (2009): "The Vietnamese Southward Expansion, as Viewed Through the Histories". in Hardy, Andrew et al. (ed): Champā and the Archaeology of Mỹ Sơn (Vietnam). NUS Press, Singapore, p.65

Vietnamese capital city of Thăng Long (modern Hanoi) twice, once in 1371 and again in 1377.



***Figure 21**: A late 19th Century Iranūn warship built for speed, maneuverability, and efficiency.*
The Lanong can reach up to 98 ft. long and 20 ft. wide amidships, crewed by up to 150 to 200 men. Unlike the karakoa, the lanong were heavily armed specifically for naval engagements. The prow jutted past the keel into a breakhead that also mounted a long gun (Layla in Iranūn) and several swivel guns (Lantaka). Description by Wikipedia. Illustration by Rafael Monleón (1890), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70261795.

The Chams then forced the king of Đại Việt, Trần Phế Đế, to move the state's treasures and wealth to Mount Thienkien and the Kha-lang Caves in 1379. Chế Bồng Nga continued to occupy the two southern Vietnamese provinces of Nghệ An and Thanh Hóa, though he was stopped by Hồ Quý Ly in 1380 and 1382. In 1390, he was finally stopped in another invasion of the capital, when his royal barge suffered a musketry salvo.

There is a record of a King of Champā called A-da-a-zhe (阿荅阿者), "King of the King"[89] (JK Whitmore, 2011), in the record of the Ming Dynasty (Ming Shi-lu) (MSL). He recorded tributes to send a delegation to China from 1369 to 1390. It is believed this figure is called the Champā king Chế Bồng Nga, Po Binasuor or Sultan Zainal Abidin, who ruled the kingdom of Champā from 1360 until his death in 1390.

Chế Bồng Nga apparently managed to unite the Cham lands under his rule and by 1361 was strong enough to attack Vietnam from the sea. His Cham forces raided the Vietnamese capital city of Thăng Long (modern Hanoi) twice, once in 1371 and again in 1377.

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After Zainal Abidin, major wars with Vietnam were fought again in the 15th century, which eventually led to the demise of Vijaya in 1471. The citadel was besieged for one month when the Vietnamese troops had to withdraw because of food shortage. The final attack came in early 1471 after almost 70 years without major military confrontation between Champā and Đại Việt. It was the straw that broke the camel's back for Champā.

It is interpreted to have been a reaction to Champā asking China for reinforcements to attack Đại Việt. Much of Champā was dissolved after the 1471 Cham–Vietnamese War; Vijaya was completely destroyed; while other southern principalities went into a protectorate-like status with Đại Việt.

[89] The Last Great King of Classical Southeast Asia: 'Chế Bồng Nga' and Fourteenth-Century Champā," in The Cham of Vietnam: History, Society and Art, edited by Trần Kỳ Phương and Bruce M. Lockhart. Singapore: NUS Press, 2011



***Figure 22**: How the house of the Iranūn, Magindanao and Sulog سولُغ is descended from the nobility of Champā.*

Contrary to Maspero's reconstruction of Champā history leading up to the invasion of 1471, whose view was upheld by George Coedès's classic study of the "Hinduized states of Southeast Asia", the ethnicity of Champā was never predominantly Cham. Through all the centuries of Champā's existence, the Malay, the Bugis, the Iranūn, and other island Southeast Asians had been, more or less, involved themselves as traders, mercenaries, and courtiers to succeeding generations of rulers. Champā had been a loose confederations of sorts, whose composition was continually being redefined. It was not as monolithic as early scholars had contended. But the least appreciated or rather most obscured is the Iranūn's participation.

Champā did not end abruptly after the fall of Vijaya (Vijayapura) in 1471, as Maspero would have us believe. The Ming Dynasty continued to receive envoys from, and grant investiture to, Cham rulers through the 1540s. The flow of refugees to the south was heavy though and the flight of Cham across the South China Sea unrestrained. The Iranūn had especially been heavily engaged when the capital shifted to Pāṇḍuraṅga (the modern provinces of Bình Thuận and Ninh Thuận) where they have built communities there while maintaining trade and communications networks. In fact, one can even point that at Pāṇḍuraṅga was the Iranūn's golden age in mainland Southeast Asia.

The great exodus of the Cham people to different points of Southeast Asia was poorly documented so there is not much literature on it. But some snippets of the royal refugees are found in Malay scripts.

In the 17th century, the last Iranūn-Bugis to leave Champā were the descendants of the house of Raja Pandara. The rest who stayed were absorbed among the Bani Cham or took independent settlements in the borders with Cambodia.

CHAPTER 8 INFLUENCES AND IRANŪN TRAIL IN SIAM AND CAMBODIA

Except for the usual generalities in their account, never in their wildest dreams would Filipino historians have thought for any concrete manifestation of the relationship between the Philippines and mainland Southeast Asia. And in the struggle for the ownership of the islands in the Champā Sea (now South China Sea), the Chinese is just all too smug and happy with this historical blindsiding. This is rather strange when we consider that the early Filipinos at the coming of the Iberians spoke Cham, Thai and Malay. Humabon conversed with the captain of the ship from "Ciama" or Siam which Pigafetta came across in the sea.

While for the most part, the generic presence of "Malay" in the mainland Southeast Asia is acknowledged, the Iranūn and the Bugis are rarely mentioned, if at all. While group identity is important not only to sociologists today as in the past in the sense that is it is based on shared beliefs, practices, and real and fictive ancestors, historians had been unreflectively careless in failing to take into account the dynamics associated with tribal affiliation, its continuing transformation and fluidity.

The study of ethnicity is complicated by the intense emotional attachment it evokes on ordinary folks, and the Moro of the Philippines has been no exception. Among the credits in wars and skirmishes, and even in terms for claims for antiquity and origins of kingdoms and down to who first received the Sharifs in the contest for ascendancy. All these milestones are chalked up as prizes coveted in terms of ethnicity. "Too often the story of Southeast Asia has been structured according to ethnic struggles, a *presentist* approach that obscures the flexibility of ethnic identities in the past."[90]

Naturally, the Iranūn as traders speaks and even dresses as "Malay", Malay being the *lingua franca* of commerce in those days. Francisco Combés who spent twelve years as a missionary in Mindanao and who had been accused of being careless in many of his

[90] Leonard Y. Andaya (2008). Leaves of the same tree: trade and ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka. University of Hawaii Press. 5. ISBN 0-8248-3189-6. Retrieved 2010-11-28

writings had, in fact, been on-point in his description of the Lutaos[91], or the Lŭtao-Iranūn in their "Moorish dress of turban and marlota"[92].

Too often even pilgrims from the Philippines to Mecca were lumped up with the Jâwah of Indonesia and the Malay archipelagos. In the eyes of the Mekkans and the rest of the Arab population, they were all of the same stock. Up until the 80s during the boom of contract workers in the Middle East, Meccans still called Filipino pilgrims as Jâwah.

[91] Blair and Robertson Vol. 40, note 4: "Blumentritt (Tribes of the Philippines) identities the Lutaos with the Moro of the district of Zamboanga, who are frequently called Ilanos, and adds that the name appears to be the Hispanicized form of the Malay Orang-Laút ("Men of the Sea"). The description given by Combes fits rather the Orang-Laút themselves than the Ilanos, who live along the seacoast west of Malabang..."

[92] *mahkuta*, headdress

Figure 23.One could easily mistook this old lady as a 'Babo' in Maranao, a Magindanao or a Sulog.
But she is a Cham Muslim in Châu Đốc, Vietnam. Cham diaspora farther spelled into the neighboring countries as well. In 1833, after the fall of Phnom Penh [capital of Cambodia] into Siamese hands, the Siamese led an attack on Châu Đốc and took 3,000 captives back to Siam, many amongst them Cham. Photo: Adam Jones Adam63, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

The exploits of the Iranūns in Southeast Asia is little noticed in history books because they, as a grouping, are always lumped up with Malay adventurers and soldiers-of-fortunes, the Orang Laut of the Javanese straits, the Chams of Indo-China, the Cambodians and even with the Japanese *wokou*, not to mention their being mistaken for the perennial Bugis from Sulawesi, to which they are so intimately associated. While it is true that, at one time or another, a factor pervading the abovementioned groups is piracy (in European eyes to which almost invariably the identity of the Iranūn is pegged), equally true is that their common denominator is their being country traders. The Iranūns were among the early ones who took advantage of the opening up of China in the 14th century when China changed its dynasty from Mongol to Ming. The Iranūns were first and foremost traders — one of the most mobile lot of the Austronesian descendants in the Pacific.

It never occurred to the historians of the north (Manila) that much material could be uncovered if they shift their investigations and research towards the South, especially Lanao on the early Iranūn, their culture, manuscripts, oral traditions and social practices. What image of the Iranūn in today's textbooks is largely defined by Warren's seminal work on 18th and 19th century Iranūn. This late — and a drop in the bucket at that — it is now how the reading public perceives the Iranūn generally, if they knew about them at all. But despite being dubbed as the 'Iranūn Age', this is just a scratching of the surface in the Iranūn's history and culture. In the course of their long career, the Iranūn had to reinvent themselves many times over and adapt themselves to their changing fortunes, especially with the coming of the European colonialists.

> From 1820 to 1848 when regional trade was firmly controlled by the Taosug, some of the descendants of these immigrants shifted their ethnic affiliation as their communities grew and became more heterogeneous. They did not call themselves "Iranun" but went by the name of their village or island — a'a Tunkil, "the people of Tunkil". On Jolo some adopted Taosug ethnicity. Other Iranun communities remained discrete, unincorporated; at the beginning of the

twentieth century they could still be recognized as a separate element in many localities.[93]

The import the Iranūn brings in tracing the history of the Philippines and to some extent its neighboring regions, particularly Sulawesi, Minangkabau, Maluku, Borneo, Champā, Combodia, and even Siam cannot be overemphasized. The network the Iranūn had wrought in his *wanderungslust* glued together desperate regions of Southeast Asia through a commitment in maritime commerce. There is now "an awareness that from late prehistoric times until into the second millennium AD, the great navigators in the region were neither Indians nor Chinese, but Southeast Asians, in particular those belonging to the Austronesian language family, whose distribution from Taiwan to the Philippines and Indonesia and from the Pacific Ocean (Polynesia) to Madagascar proves their seagoing skills."[94]

The Bugis and the Iranūn had a long-standing hold on the offshore islands of mainland Southeast Asia mainly because of their relations to Cambodia and Champā. While the Iranūn had the Pulo Condor mainly, the Bugis had the Pulo Ubi. Chao Ju-kua [1082-1088] states that Po-ssŭ-lan (Basilan) was a dependency of Cambodia. "According to Chao Yen-wei, Po-ssŭ-lan and the other four places had kapok and cloth. Chao Ju-kua associates cotton products with his Philippine place names."[95] Indeed, Basilan is a traditional Iranūn enclave.

One of the earliest pioneers of Basilan was Bataraān Di ḱilatên[96] [c. 1310], a near contemporary of Tuan Mawmin {Datu Maimbung}. Among his progenies was Datu Buri Baringīgan who married into the *Batalo Pagilidan* as his wife Sibiȳan is a daughter of the Ḅaì sa Bŭgasan. It was these generations of Iranūn maritime traders and warriors who entrenched themselves in the southern coast of mainland Southeast Asia for centuries. The Champā Sea then virtually was their lake as they made use of Sulawan (Spratlys) as a relay point for their trade and liaison with the mainland.

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[93] James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768-1898, The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeas Asian Maritime State* (Secon Edition) (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2007.

[94] Michael Vickery, "A critical review of the sources for the history of Angkor and Champā," International Institute for Asian Studies Field: History. Period of stay at IIAS: 01-09-2005 to 30-11-2005

[95] O. W. Wolters, "A Few and Miscellaneous Pi-Chi Jottings on Early Indonesia", Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University, Indonesia, No. 36 (Oct., 1983), pp. 49-65. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3351026 .Accessed: 28/06/2014 15:19, p. 62-63

[96] Genealogy ref.: Angkaya sa Maciu Salsila by Baí Macabai (Hadja Zohra) Mangandog; Maranao: So Totholanon, Taritib, Ijma, ago Impit a Salsila (by Dr. Moh'd Saadudin Talib B. Lomondot); Radyâ Indarāpatra Gugudan, Compiled by Abdurahman M.Abbas {Panggaga Adel da Bubong a Marahui

A seven generation descendant, Amaloy ā Pakatan امالويآفكاتن[c. 1520-] known as Gadiya Muda غديامودا saw battles in Cambodia, Burma and Ayuthaya.[97] His brother, Amaloy ā Ṭōpāän (तूफान)) (Ŏnkaya Amaloy), had a placed named after him. The Amaloy in Basilan is a toponym of Buadi Amaloy in Poönā Maçiu in highland Lanao. How is this so is that Ālamā Šyarīf Āngcaya {Šyarīf Ŏnkaya sa Basilan}, a son of Amaloy ā Ṭōpāän, migrated to Lanao after having received from his brother Manŭśên {Šyarīf Mahradyâ} a chunk of *Tanah Putih* (White Earth), which he eventually planted in Poönā Maçiu. The place reserved for his progenies was named *Buadi Amaloy* (Issues of Amaloy).[98]

Ālamā Šyarīf Āngcaya had married the daughter of Adaśaolan[99] {Měrhoum Adapŭn Paśaolan} named Ampayong {Putri Gayung sa Lumbayanāgué}. [100] Adaśaolan pioneered the settlement of Basilan during the start of the colonial era while his first cousin Batara Shah Tengah (Pangiran Tindig) (Měrhoum Tanga) became the Regent King of Sulo 1585-1600} after his father Rajah Iro {Merhoum Buddiman} abandoned Sulu in the wake of the sack of the island by the Spaniards and migrated to Brunei where he eventually died. Raja Tengah's subservience to the Spaniards was understandable but it did not bode well with Sa'id Sa'adat Shah {Said ud-din Barakat} {Sultan of Ternate 1583-1606}, who was continuing the program his father had initiated, Kyai Chili Baru Paduka Sri Babu'llah Datu Shah {Sultan of Ternate 1570-1583}. A power struggle ensued where Tengah was killed by Adaśaolan. After his death, the Spaniards did not deign to fight against the adversary and left. Adaśaolan became the De facto Regent of Sulu [1600-1606]. He rebuilt Sulu from the ground up and instituted the merchant guild *Ruma Bichara* and over time it became the de-facto counsel for the young Raja Bongsu while he was maturing. When Raja Bongsu was ready, the throne was transferred to him by the *Ruma Bichara* without qualms. The *Ruma Bichara* then stayed on to continually advise the ruler and the members of the guild each gets a weighted vote on the collective decisions made by the state.

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[97] See relevant story in Chapter 9.

[98] The details of this episode, so important among the Maranao in deciding the ascension to the throne of Sultan sa Maçiu will be given in the *Monsoon Riders Series: The Iranūn of Southeast Asia.*

[99] Adaśaolan, the name used by Combés in his account, is an Iranūn shortening of the name Adapŭn Paśaolan. See, Francsico Combes, "Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, A General Survey of the Islands and Their Inhabitants, Nature, Character and Customs (1645) (Translation by J. H. Sutherland), *The Mindanao Herald*, February 3, 1909.

[100] Genealogy ref.: Salsila sa Bayang (Based on the Salsila of Sangcopan, Grand Parent of Jalani Dimaporo Sangcopan}. Translated from the kirim script by Datu Acmad 'Ontay' Macagaan Abdulmadid; Dalŭm ā Poōna Bayabao (Heritage of Lanao - Part 4) by Aksaran (Hadji Abdul Rauf) Amisa (Amin Zacaria)

Now the honorific Ŏnkaya is an adaptation of the Khmer Ŏknha ឧកញ៉ា, meaning a "tycoon".[101] The title "Oknha" was transformed into Thai as Okya (ออกญา) by the Ayutthaya Kingdom. The word Oknha is referred to as Ốc nha (屋牙) in ancient Vietnamese records. Until the 20th century, the title Ungkaya is still being used by traditional regional chiefs in Basilan.

Besides the usual trade, Sulog (Sulu), Basilan and Southwest Mindanao has cultural influences from mainland Southeast Asia. The distinctive finger dance, the *Pangalay* is a testament to mainland Southeast Asian influence. In Cambodia, they are the Apsarā dancers performing a set of disciplined moves, slowly strecthing back their wrist, doing a series of gestures that evoke offering of flowers and fruits to the deities. Apsarā is the Sanskrit अप्सरा apsarā, a type of female spirit of the clouds and waters in Hinduism and Buddhist culture. It is locally known as Apashrā in Mindanao and Sulu and is still in vogue today as a female name among Maranao, Tausug, and Magindanao.

On their naming convention, even latter Iranūn is influenced by the Siamese. Take for instance the *bunga emas.* The name Bungāämas is an Iranūn common name until the last century. There is, for instance, Ḅaì Bungāämas, the wife of Radyâ Mamarŭngkas {Sultan sa Wiyāän}. There is also Putrí Bungāämas, a wife of Kalipapa Tuansi. Also, Bungāämas sa Kalahui, a daughter of Mĕrhoum Mangġong (Tomanggong) {Sultan sa Kalahui}.[102] The *bunga emas* is an intricately crafted golden flower which vassal states in the Malay Peninsula, in particular, Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, Pattani, Nong Chik, Yala, Rangae, Kubang Pasu and Setul used to send to Siam for centuries as tribute. The tribute, an acknowledgement of suzerainty, consisted of two small trees made of gold and silver, accompanied by gifts of weapons, goods and slaves. Even Lord Nguyễn Ánh of Nguyễn clan had offered *bunga emas* to the Siamese king six times to gain military support for his campaign against the Tây Sơn dynasty.[103] The Kedah Sultanate who had long been pining for the return of some of the Bunga Emas, had in 2015 formally requested Thailand for the return of some of the tributes. The

[101] It is the opinion of the author that the root word of Ŏknha is Orang Kaya, which means a "man of means". Orang Kaya found a later iteration in upland Lanao as Orang Gaga, which has the same import.
[102] *Genealogy ref.*: Gugudan ko Mala ā Bangsa by Baì Macabaì Mangandog; First Educational Conference and Seminar on the Taritib and Ijma of the Four Principalities of Lanao (2015) by Sultan Hj. Abdel Malik Saidar D. Noor, Sultan sa Dangiprampiai; Makaisug Pumbaya Archives, image ref. # 20210901_092700.
[103] https://www.facebook.com/SEAheritagehistory

Kedah Sultanate had presented 27 *Bunga Emas* to the Royal Crown. They are now on exhibit at the Royal Grand Palace in Bangkok.[104]

The fall of the principality of Vijaya did not spell the end of the Cham kingdoms. At worst, in so far as the Iranuns are concerned, they fell back on Pāṇḍuraṅga while others found new settlements across Cambodia. The high point of their presence in Cambodia came when in 1644, the ruler Ramadhipati រាមាធិបតីទី១ [1614-1659] embraced

Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Ibrahim. He was also known as Ponhea Chan ពញ្ញាចន្ទ. He was strongly influenced by the Orang Kayas around him. On the Mekong,

Ramadhipati adapted a Malay court. This move allowed him to retain the throne longer than any of his predecessors.

During his reign, Phnom Penh was bustling with commerce and merchants from all over came. Daily life was complicated with the swell of Chinese refugees after the fall of the Ming Dynasty in 1644. To manage things, Ramadhipati kept a stable of faithful Iranūn merchants (Orang Laut) who doubled as amphibian warriors to help him police the sea. They are stationed at Pulu Ubi and Pulu Condor which they use as forward bases, a fallback whenever things get awry at the mainland. Among the Iranun warlords at Ramathipadi's beck and call was Inche Kamad {Kŭmad) sa Maluso [b.c. 1612]. Kamad's father was Inche Ungcaya (Encik Chuanzhu sa Condor) who married Pinorot, a daughter of Putrí Nandaopan sa Sulūg. He married a daughter of Radyâ sa Pulo ā Condor (Con Dau Son).

Meanwhile, the ascension of Ramadhipati to the throne in 1642 coincided with the declaration of Kudarat as the first Sultan of Magindanao, converting the kingdom into an Islamic enclave in alliance with the Kingdom of Ternate. The ceremony was held in Simuay in fulfillment of Kudarat's vow after gaining his tuition from the panditas. One of his most accomplished tuan-guro was the celebrated pandita Jannatun Nayīm Alī 'ud-Din al-Rāmītanī (Alondíng)[105] who was a *sufi* practitioner of the Shaṭṭārīyah

[104] "Kedah endeavours to bring back 'Bunga Emas' from Thailand", https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2015/09/30/kedah-endeavours-to-bring-back-bunga-emas-from-thailand/979313

[105] Jannatun Naim [c. 1599-] had Sultan Kudarat walk through the intricacies of sufi teachings. So rare in his time, Jannatun Naim was one of the few Filipinos who had been to Arabia to seek knowledge. His name was taken from a passage in the Quran: Jannatun Naim, meaning "one who fell asleep in Heaven", alluding to his travel to Mecca and Medina. *Genealogy ref.*: Moriatao Olama sa Basak Binidayan; Salsila sa Bayang (Based on Salsila of Sangcopan, Grand Parent of Jalani Dimaporo Sangcopan} transliterated from the kirim script by Datu Acmad "Ontay" Macagaan Abdulmadid; Manuscript #3, The Genealogy of Bwayan, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion, by Najeeb M. Saleeby, source: Twan Kali (through the favor of Sharif Afdal); Balindong Dynasty of the Diminion of Maciu, The: A Brief History by Monsing Macabando, Chair of the Marahui Sultanate League.

Order. The pomp and feasting lasted for days and delegations of well-wishers came from many regions in the *nusantara* and from across the South China Sea.

Since the 1630s, the Dutch East India Company had established a presence in the capital Phnom Penh, and upon the ascension of Ramadhipati, tensions rose among various groups: the Dutch, Portuguese, and the Orang Kayas. Ramadhiipati ousted the Dutch with the help of the Orang Kayas, particularly the Bugis and the Iranūn who massacred the representatives of the Company and the rest imprisoned. This was not to be the last engagement between the Iranūn and the Dutch. As the classic *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (The Precious Gift) bares, a work of Malay literature written by Raja Ali Haji in Jawi, the Iranūn and the Dutch would be pitted against each other once again in a bigger battle in Riau in 1787.[106]

While a boon to the Orang kayas, Ramadhipati's conversion, however, drew the ire of the Cambodians who were mostly Buddhist, who sought the help of the Nguyễn lords to oust him from power. In 1658, a Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia, deposed Ramadhipati, and imprisoned him in Quảng Bình.[107]

The presence of the Iranūn in several pockets of the Malay peninsula were resented but they assisted the Malay in their expeditions. As late as 1789, the Iranūn allies of the Siak nakhoda, Syed Ali mounted with him an attack on Songkhla in Siam, burning the city, seized two Chinese junks and in the Iranūn's signature offensive, carted away a number of Siamese. The raid was made on behalf of the Kedah Sultan, 'Abdu'llah al-Mukarram Shah *ibni* al-Marhum Sultan Muhammad Jiwa Zain al-'Adilan Mu'azzam Shah {Al-Marhum Kota Star al-Thani}.[108]

However, it did not stop the Siamese to counter. "The mid-1780s witnessed major punitive Siamese military action against Patani, which in 1791 was placed under the authority of Songkhla's Siamese governor, thereby paving the way for the 19th century Siamese policy of splitting up the region and replacing Malay rulers with Thai administrators."[109]

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[106] This will be treated in full by the author in one of his volumes in the *Monsoon Riders Series: The Iranūn of Southeas Asia.*

[107] Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: a world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur (Virginia: R. R. Donnelley, 2007).

[108] (SSFR 2, 17 July 1789, Francis Light to Governor General; Forrest, 1972:192-193; Ali, 2007a; and Ali & Tarsat, 2017).

[109] Bruckmayr, Philipp, *Cambodia's Muslims and the Malay World, Malay Language, Jawi Script, and Islamic Factionalism from the 19th Century to the Present* (Leidin: Koninklijke Brill, 2019), 34.

CHAPTER 9
CAMBODIA ASKED MAGINDANAO'S HELP; IBERIANS' ATTEMPT TO GAIN FOOTHOLD IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Spanish attempt to encroach into mainland Southeast Asia (never mind Japan and China) is an episode that had not found purchase in Filipino local history because it is considered as purely an Iberian affair, and a one-off at that.

An article that partly tried to come to grips of these events was written in 1969 by Carlos Quirino, entitled First Philippine Expedition to Indo-China. Quirino had made it clear that his title was referring to the Indios and not the Spaniards:

> What made the native allies, the Indios as the Filipinos were then called, join their masters? Plunder, plenty of it, for despite the agreement that only a third would be given them there were always ways of secreting valuable jewel or two.[110]

Quirino's article was prompted by the discovery of Alain Burke Miailhe from a British bookseller of the minutes of the Manila government's deliberations of the merits and demerits of the expedition to mainland Southeast Asia. It turned out the mention of the Filipinos was only a come on. The "minutes" which is 64% of the word count is in my opinion the (only) selling point or the *raison d'etre* of the article.

Quirino's queries in the article showed general naivety on the issues that plagued the Spanish at the time. The minutes of the deliberation made it unequivocally clear that

[110] Quirino, Carlos. "First Philippine Expedition to Indo-China." Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 10, no. 3, [Department of History, National University of Singapore, Cambridge University Press], 1969, pp. 491–500, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27651723.

besides restoring the deposed Cambodian king, the expedition was "to punish the neighboring king of Champā con una guerra a fuego y sangre"[111] for which the Dominicans led by Fray Alonso Jimenez lent the proposal a religious justification. Quirino was perplexed, and asked:

> But since it was the king of Siam who had dethroned Praunkar langara, why did the hierarchy approve of a war against the king of Champā? This point has not been made clear in the minutes."[112]

To the writer this needed some clarifications, but to the council of war in Manila it was plain as day that the elephant in the room need not be mentioned. The Spanish knew that even if they succeed in Christianizing the Cambojan king, they will have to deal with Champā and its Mussolman (Muslim) supporters, who did not hide their resentment of King Satha harboring Portuguese and later Spaniards in his court. Champā had been a staunch supporter of containing the spread of Christianity in Asia, that is why along with the restoring king Praunkar langara (King Satha), the Spanish made it a priority to "punish" and get rid of the "tyrant" from Champā who were supported by the Orangkayas, many of whom were Bugis and Iranūns or just plain Malay.

After the Spaniards had a modicum of consolidation of Manila and its environs, historians tend to regard the turn of the 17th century as the initial skirmishes between the Moro and the Spaniards. The so-called 'Moro Wars' was supposedly inaugurated by the war party consisting of polyglot forces headed by Râja Śirūngan and Datu Sali(Gugu ā Saricula) that raided Panay with 4,000 men.

But in fact the seeds of animosity had been planted much earlier in far-off Brunei, Maluku, Malacca, Sumatra and mainland Southeast Asia. The skirmishes between the Iranūn orangkayas settled in Champā and Cambodia and the Iberians is the least known. In fact, part of the polyglot forces of Râja Śirūngan and Gugu Saricula were Iranūn from the mainland headed by their own *nakhodas* who used Pulo Condor فولوكُندور as a launch off point and made a rendezvous with the rest of the fleet at Balabac بَلَبك Island south of Palawan فَلَوَن before their raiding started. Filipino historians tend to think of native Filipinos' reach during the colonial times were confined only to coastal fishing areas of what the Spaniards had defined as Islas Filipinas, and the Chinese who wanted the disputed islands for themselves could not agree more!

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[111] …with a war with fire and blood
[112] *Ibid*.

The foray of the Spanish in mainland Southeast Asia is especially important as it demonstrates how the Iranūn had been leveraging the South China Sea in their trade and raiding down the multiple nodes of their 'unorthodox' route. The *Carta Indegina Filipina* clearly delineates their forward bases and watering holes, appropriately marked by red color.

Since the union of Portugal and Spain in 1580, together they embarked on a program of targeting common enemies. The hatred of the Iberians against the Champā king then knew no bounds. On the one hand, Champā was undermining the Portuguese in Malaccca:

> As late as the end of the sixteenth century, the Cham were still able to honour their alliance with the Malay Archipelago when in 1594 the Cham ruler sent a force to assist the ruler of the Malay Kingdom of Melaka-Johor in trying to dislodge the Portuguese from Melaka.[113]

On the other hand, Champā is helping out the Iranūn raid on budding Spanish settlements in Lucon and Visayas, using Pāṇḍuraṅga, Palawan فَلَوَن and the offshore island of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور as a jump off point.

Coming to a head

When Cambodia was threatened by an invasion from Siam it made several requests for military aid. In many textbooks, they were a confusion of mixture of the requests for aid and the fate of the elephants presented as gifts.

The request for Philippine military aid made by Cambodia actually came from separate factions addressed to different quarters.

The first request for military aid when Cambodia was threatened by an invasion from Siam in 1593 was with the Portuguese in Malacca. Since 1570 Portuguese Dominicans and later the Franciscans had been hard on missioning Cambodia with dismal results. Opposing them were the influx of Cham Muslim community from Vijaya (the northern principality of Champā which fell to the Đại Việt in 1471) and the Malay and Iranūn merchants. Many of them were settled in Srei Santhor. Diego Belloso (Veloso in Spanish), a Portuguese who happened to insinuate himself into the royal court by having married a relative of the king tried to broker aid from the Portuguese of

[113] Early modern Southeast Asia, 1350-1800/editors, Ooi Keat Gin, Hoàng Anh Tuấn, (Routledge: New York, 2016), 213.

Malacca, but he could not tear away a portion of the forces that were putting up a vigil on the seas observing the movements of the Malays and other Europeans in the area. Since the Portuguese had taken over Malacca in 1511, there were no fewer than ten major assaults on it, the latest of which was in 1587.[114]

When Siam invaded Cambodia at its capital, king Satha (Saṭṭā in Iranūn) fled. The Rajas (Iranūns and Malays) then seized the initiative in the border of Camboja and installed Rama Chung Prey in 1594 as the new king, driving away the Siamese. The Rajas asked the Cham king to help stabilize Rama Chung at his court, but with the precarious situation and the many commitments of the Champā King, he could not allot forces to the new king. It fell on the Rajahs clustered around Rama to seek reinforcement from the Telluk Llanun, southwest of Mindanao. They initially approached the Sultan Abdul Jalil Syah II [1576-1597] at Johor but he was preoccupied with the Portuguese. Alas, this is a period in Southeast Asia when so much was going on at the same time that every army is spread thin on all fronts.

The "Notices of the Indian Archipelago and adjacent countries (1837)" stated as follows that the Cham King and the Rajahs (Iranūn and Malay) sent an embassy first to Magindanao and having failed proceeded to Manila asking the same assistance:

> …about the year 1600, the Emperor of Cochin-China and the Rajahs of the eastern parts of Camboja, sent Ambassadors to Megidano begging assistance against the king of Siam; which request was refused, as the Rajah of Megidano had himself no cause of quarrel with Siam, besides some of his family were related to the king. Upon this, the Ambassador proceeded to Manila for assistance, but the Spaniards had their hands full of other important matters.[115]

But this is inaccurate as the Cham King and the Iranūn Rajahs were a perennial enemy of the Spaniards so the embassy could not have ventured farther to Manila. The mission was on behalf of Rama Chung who was installed by the Rajahs after driving away the Siam forces. Now they need help against the Iberians (joint Portuguese and Spanish) to allow the new king to consolidate himself in power. On the other hand, the mission to Manila was a group of Portuguese and Spaniard soldiers-of-fortune who was lobbying for military assistance on behalf of the ousted king Satha to bring him back to his throne.

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[114] Ricklefs, M. C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001). 55

[115] Notices of the Indian archipelago & adjacent countries; being a collection of papers relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine islands, Sulus, Siam … Moor, J. H. Singapore, 1837. p.46

The chief of Magindanao at the time of the embassy from Cambodia was Datu Dimasangḱay ā Adil [1546-1596], known to the Spaniards as Panguilan Limasancay[116]. The one who dictated the maritime forces, however, was his younger brother, Katchil Buisan sa Ranau, the Raja di Laut (Datu sa Kaludan). In 1594, Magindanao, at this point, could hardly spare any forces as they were braced for a long-drawn out war with the Spaniards, besides the constant tension with the neighboring kingdom of Buayan.[117] So it was only the resourceful Iranūn of the Illana Bay with their scattered forward bases abroad who had a ready supply of men and material.

The reply of the Magindanao datu was merely diplomatic in tone because in fact he could not spare any force at all. A good portion of their forces were recruited by Buisan from his extended stay in Jailolo, Maluku, particularly the Dumatos, and they could net let go of their seasoned Iranūn warriors. In fact in 1602, Ternate Sultan Saidi had to send fleets consisting of 50 fighters with 800 soldiers led by his uncle Kacil Baba to augment Magindanao's forces in a series of battles with the Spaniards.[118] At the time also, the relationship between Magindanao and Butig (which controlled Tebouk تُبوك) was at an all-time low as Dimasangkáy was not on speaking terms with Datu Pŭndúma[119] since 1579, when the latter "usurped" one of Dimasangkáy's wife, Ratu Ŭmpas {Radyâ Putrí} [c. 1556], as his own.

Dimasangḱay ā Adil said that he "had himself no cause of quarrel with Siam, besides some of his family were related to the king." This polite refusal acknowledged the contiguous view of the Iranūn of the territories in mainland Asia. The real connection of the Iranūn is with Cambodia where some Iranūn had mixed marriages with the kin of the royalty in various epochs, and more so with the Chams at Pāṇḍuraṅgan, their main bastion. It is due to the close knit kinship of Telluk Llanun or Têbuk with both Champā and Cambodia that they had a free reign on Pulau Ubi and Pulau Condor for a long time.[120]

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[116] Blair, E. H. and Robertson, J. A. (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Vol. 4 of 55, 1576-1582.

[117] A little later, in 1597, Buisan was humbled by the veteran Râja Śirūngan in the Battle of Buayan.

[118] M. Adnan Amal, *Kepulauan Rempah-Rempah Perjalanan Sejarah Maluku Utara 1250 - 1950*.

[119] Genealogy ref.: Hja. Zakia D. Indar, Dozonan Gugudan (from old manuscript);
Najeeb M. Saleeby, "Manuscript #3, The Genealogy of Bwayan", Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905; Salimah S. Camama, Historical Evolution of the Sultanates in Marawi: Implication to Peace and Order (2016 thesis)

[120] For a thorough discussion of this, see the chapter on Mabay sa Condor

CHAPTER 10 IRANŪN'S STEERAGE OF CHAM REFUGEES

Adrift in a déjà vu: the 'boat people'

Following the end of the Vietnam war in 1975, when the Americans abruptly abandoned South Vietnam, the migration and humanitarian crisis that the so-called "boat people' spawned was at its height in 1978 and 1979 and continued through the 1990s. The boat people refer to the Vietnamese who left their country in mass exodus by the sea to escape the mayhem. Some 800,000 people were lucky to survive the passage and made landfall to other countries. Others between 200,000 and 400,000 perished in the ordeal. Their immediate destinations in the Southeast Asian nations: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong.

The humanitarian crisis the exodus caused involved the Western countries after the Southeast Asian countries were unwilling anymore to admit on their shores the boat people as their sheer number multiplied. This episode in the history of Southeast Asian history left an indelible mark that it was hoped that would never ever happen again.

However, looking back in history, this exodus was in fact a repeat of the exodus of the Chams some five hundred years back following their defeat by the Đại Việt (North Vietnamese) which culminated in 1471.

The year 1471was the breakthrough when the capital city of Vijaya was overran by the invading Đại Việt (Annamese) forces where 60,000 inhabitants died and another 60,000 were taken as slaves by the Emperor Lê Thánh Tông who annexed the principalities (kampong كمفوڠ) Amravati and Vijaya as one of the territories of Vietnam. This event triggered mass emigration of refugees by the hundreds of thousands, mostly by the sea. The destination of the Cham population were Khmer (Cambodia), Malacca, Aceh, some parts of Sumatra, Borneo and the Philippines. Compared to the

'boat people', this was even of a greater magnitude when we take into account the ratio of the emigrants to the total population of the time.

The immediate effect of the 1471 invasion is a spillover of the Chams westward to Cambodia. These events were captured by the Khmer Royal Chronicles as commoner and princes trekked towards the border. Since then exodus of refugees streamed through Cambodia as the Đại Việt pushed southward with its notorious "Nam-tin". Not only that. Vietnam even encroached into Khmer territories including Saigon.

In 1692 a second wave of great migration occurred after a great Vietnamese victory. About five thousand families led by the royal family asked for protection from the Khmer king Jayajettha III (1677–1709) who settled them in the capital Qudong, and various places. However, the house of Raja Pandara along with their urubarang chose to migrate across the sea ro Tebouk تْبوك, while still others paid for their flight to other points of island Southeast Asia.

Considering that even after the fall of Vijaya, the Cham retreated to the southernmost kampong كمفوغْ of Pāṇḍuraṅga to wage their stand. And through the ensuing decades until late in the sixteenth century, the flow of migrants into other islands of Southeast Asia was unabated. It was this infusion of population that strengthened the polities of the islands in the Philippines before the Europeans came.

The 'boat people' retracing the old Iranūn route relived ancient history to confirm the route of the Iranūn at the South China Sea. In the 1970s through the 1990s, the Philippines grudgingly welcomed these mostly Vietnamese and Chinese refugees that never go beyond an obligation of fulfilling a quota under the spirit of universal humanitarian aid. The Malay were more subtle though in choosing who to admit in their ranks by allowing ethnic Chams (mostly Bani Cham Muslims), embracing them with the accolade of a long lost kinsman (sesama rumpun).[121] The glaring difference in the attitude towards this people is so because the Malay keep their hikayat so they more or less know their ancient connections while Filipinos generally are blissfully unaware of their ancestors' provenance. Little do they know as they allowed these 'boat people' in their fold that they may be the last batch of exodus from Champā into their archipelago (albeit a gap of no less than five centuries from the last one!). This earlier migration allowed the sparsely populated islands to gain the much needed density of population — a key component to later nationhood.

[121] Danny Wong Tze Ken, "Historical Relations between the Chams and the Malays: Sustaining Common Identity, Culture and Ethnicity through Two Millennia of Relations". January 2008, *Southeast Asia History and Culture* 2008(37):112-136 DOI:10.5512/sea.2008.37_112

The boat people ought to be a memory juggler for Philippine historians to reflect and reconsider the way we frame or theorize our pre-colonial past. But despite this God-sent late 'reminder', in the shape of this hapless 'boat people', we continue to be oblivious of our ancient provenance. Our scholars of the day are so married to the 'classical' mindset of the 'rolling wave' theory from west to east — meaning Sumatra, Borneo or Java to— to explain the spread of Indianization and Islamization in the Philippines. Never did it occur to us that at the same time or even with more preponderance, it could have come about north to south — meaning, from mainland Southeast Asia.

The Singhapala Bisayans from Vijaya

Traditionally, when it comes to cultural diffusion, the general movement is always west-to-east. We speak of the Šyarīfs coming from the west (Johor), or Islam introduced by way of Sumatra or from some other places like Borneo or from faraway Hydramaut. It is almost counterintuitive to point from another direction. The framework of Indianization blindsided our historians in overlooking the close relation between the Philippines and mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Champā. This is the reason we fail to take into account other possible angles that give concrete details as to how Philippine history had unfolded.

There seems to be a consensus among Filipino scholars that the Bisayans (Visayan) were so named for having hailed from the Śrīvijaya Empire. This is almost a no-brainer, so to speak. "A theory proposed by some scholars state that the term Visayas was derived from the name of a 7th-century thalassocratic Malay Śrīvijaya Empire."[122] A typical entry goes that:

> "Raja Muda Lumaya, known as a rebellious prince, is said to be part-Tamil and part-Malayan noble from the Chola Empire of Sumatra, and his title raja muda suggests that he was a crown prince. He was then ordered by a maharaja to establish a military outpost in the ancient Philippines for exploratory missions — instead, Lumaya founded his own kingdom."[123]

Relying mainly on generic overtones, a story of this sort is easy to identify as contrived. Lost in the argument is that the "presence of Sanskrit was largely due to local rulers adopting the high culture of Hinduism for prestige rather than any concerted effort

[122] Jovito S. Abellana, "Bisaya Patronymesis Sri Visjaya" (Ms.. Cebuano Studies Center, ca. 1960).
[123] https://datupress.com/2021/05/25/the-legendary-singhapala-karajaan/

on India's part to colonize the region."[124] Not that Raja Muda Lumaya is a fiction. If any tribe in the Philippines has any better claim to have come from the Śrīvijaya, it would be the ancient Iranūn as their *kirim* mansucripts bare.

Yet the Iranūn do not sport the name Bisaya. In fact the name Śrīvijaya, the identification popularized by Coedes, has no register in their salsilah at all. Not that they would not know of a powerful kingdom in Sumatra. In their salsila, The Iranūn knew of the Saliendra Dynsaty that ruled Śrīvijaya as Serandrang, the Datu sa Palao (King of the mountain), a traditional title with the Maranao and Magindanao until today.[125] Of the kingdom, they knew it as Kadarāän, the long name in Darangen being Kadarāän ā N̆dau, and this is known to the Cholas of India as Kadāram (Kedah).[126] There must be some other reasons why the Bisayan were called Visayan after all. To explore this, we have to look somewhere else. And this needs some prefacing.

The migration into many parts of Southeast Asia began in the early existence of Champā which was waging war with its perennial enemy, the Đại Việt of the north. And it has been endemic for Southeast Asians to name their new settlement after their place of origin. The Pahang state in Sumatra was once upon a time named after Inderapura. Inderapura refers to the northernmost principality (kampong كمفوڠ) of Champā from which the Cham had fled from the Đại Việt invasion in the 2nd to 3rd century CE. This occurred when after the Đại Việt had freed themselves from Chinese suzerainty, began to embark on conquering, domino-fashion, the distended spine of the five kampong كمفوڠ (principalities) of Champā: Indrapura (Indarapatra), Amaravati (Amarawati), Vijaya (Bisaya), Kauṭharā (Pagutarāän), and Pāṇḍuraṅga (Pāndara or Pāndurangan).

After the sack of Indrapura again in 982, the shift southward of the Cham capital to Vijaya (Vijayapura) became, more or less, permanent. This shift was not only dictated by putting a distance between the Cham realm from the opposing Đại Việt, thanks to the natural barriers in the terrain, but the growing international commerce at the

[124] Dellios, Rosita; Ferfuson, James R., *Thinking Through Śrīvijaya: Polycentric Networks in Traditional Southeast Asia*, Department of International Relations, Bond University, Australia. (Hall 1984, 68; Wolters 1999:108-111).

[125] Saliendra means 'King of the Mountain'. A famous Iranūn was Mharadîâ Śêrandrang (Śrindrawarman) {Datu sa Palao ā Picong ika-1}, a son of Radyâ Maraguia Dimasúba {Marajâ Insóba ko Sabāänŭn}} and Ḅai Tamŭlano (Tamŭlalanŭn sa Balabagan), Genelaogy ref.: Amaī Sanggacala's Essay on Genealogy and the General State of the Ranaū-Iranūn (1789-1916) by Sheik Mustapha Pacasum, From a 1951 narration transliterated by Adoc Bagumbaran; Gugudan ko Mala ā Bangsa by Baì Macabaì Mangandog.

[126] Sastri, K. A. Nilakanta (2000) [1935]. *The Cōlas*. Madras: University of Madras. pp. 271–272; Nilakanta, K. A. Sastri, *The Co-l.as*, 2nd revised ed. (Madras, 1955), p. 218.

beginning of the 11th century made Vijaya a natural entrepôt using the west trade route.[127]

Figure 24: *The Trà Kiệu formerly called Simhapura (Lion Citadel) is a toponym of the old capital of Cebu in Central Visayas, Philippines.*
Nothing remains of the ancient city but the rectangular ramparts. In the highlands of Lanao, a legend survives among countryside folks that in the dank forests of Butig, ruins of ancient structures had caved in, in which barahāla[128], obelisks, and steles are overrun by vegetation. Unfortunately, untitl now the area still awaits exploration.

Even today, the ancient ruins in Vijaya are a breathtaking landscape, a testament to the prosperity of the kingdom and its people. The Trà Kiệu citadel served as the capital of Campapura "where the Champā royal family and other famous family lines residing as well as a site to undertake the royal ritual ceremonies. In Sanskrit/Cham

[127] Whitmore, John K., "The Last Great King of Classical Southeast Asia: "Chế Bồng Nga"and Fourteenth-century Champā", The Cham Vietnam: History, Society and Art, ed. Trần Kỳ Phương & Bruce M. Lockhart (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), 174-175.

[128] Iranūn word for the Sanskrit: vihāra विहार

inscriptions, this is known as Siṅhapura which continued to appear in inscriptions in later period, especially during the eleventh and twelfth centuries".[129]



***Figure 25**: The two routes taken by the Chams refugees, five hundred years apart. The early refugees from Indrapura were absorbed by the local tribes. The later ones were still identifiable as Chams from Vijaya when the Spaniards came.*

The late 10th century, two migrations of Cham to the Philippines took different routes to Butuan and Sulu. The migrants to Butuan brought themselves artisans and skilled workers that allowed the locals access to technology imparted by them. The Chams were more familiar of Butuan than Sulu.

[129] Giang, Do Truong "Diplomacy, Trade and Networks: Champā in the Asian Commercial Context (7th-10 th Centuries)", Moussons [Online], 27 | 2016, Online since 17 May 2016, connection on 03 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/3521 ; DOI : 10.4000/moussons.3521]

The Chinese annals Song Shiih records the first Butuan tributary mission on March 17, 1001 CE. Butuan (P'u-tuan) is described as a Buddhist kingdom that had regular economic intercourse with Champā – a Cambodian kingdom, and intermittent contact with Imperial China under a rajah named Kiling (989-1009 AD). The sluggish commerce brought by the unrest in Champā opened an opportunity for Butuan to send a tributary embassy to China. And just two years later, King Kiling again sent his ambassadors, Liyihan and Jiaminan to the Sung Court. More ambitious was when, in 1011, Srí Bata Shaja sent his ambassador Liyu-xie with a memorial engraved on a gold tablet to demand equal status with Champā as China;s tributary.[130] This was surely the machinations of tributary brokers or factors who wanted to scalp as much commission as they could from their venture. Srí Bata Shaja was referred to by historians as a new king, but he could just have been King Kiling sporting a new title. Most tributary brokers were Persians who love to pamper their client with fancy endearments.

The Cham migrants to Sulu generally took the route south to Pāṇḍuraṅga ⇒ Pulo Condor فولوكُندور ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن ⇒ Palawan فَلَوَن ⇒ Balabac بَلَبك ⇒ Sulu (Sulog سولُغ) ⇒ Basilan بَسيلَن ⇒ Kumaladang (Southwest Mindanao). Their migration was not necessarily prompted by the unrest at Champā as it was habitual for their trade.

Sulu had developed into an entrepôt as the eastern route to China developed. The eastern route did not compete with the western route, but helped fill the need for some products that cannot be provided by the western route. According to Beyer, between the 8th to 12 centuries CE, Orang Dampuan who were believed to be Chams settled in the Sulu archipelago. Before the Spaniards arrived, four to five hundred junks arrived annually from Cambodia, Champā, and China.[131]

The natives of Sulu were always overwhelmed by the numbers of newcomers. Around 1330 there had been a mass migration from Butuan to the western parts of Mindanao, perhaps precipitated by a natural disaster if not the gradual receding of Butuan as a trading hub.

When Vijaya was sacked in 1471 CE some 500 years later, the immigrants were totally different sets of people from the ones in 982 CE. Based on their orientation, the route they take were different too. They arrived in different batches and panned to various destinations. These newcomer refugees were identifiable to have come from Vijayapura after several generations, and still so at the arrival of the Spaniards as to

[130] H. Otley Beyer, "The Philippines Before Magellan," Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association, (Oct/Nov 1921): 862.
[131] *Ibid*.

be called Bisaya. It is the royal capital Siṅhapura in Trà Kiệu citadel that the old capital of Cebu and the Visayas known as Singhapala had been named by the refugees from Champā.

The handling of refugees and settling them in various points of island Southeast Asia proved to be a big enterprise for the Bugis and the Iranūn. The influx of peoples from Champā and Cambodia into islands Southeast Asia especially the Philippines is poorly documented but we find glimpses of it in various off-hand writings like H. J. Moor's "Notices of the Indian archipelago & adjacent countries; being a collection of papers relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine islands, Sulus, Siam …" Mr. Dalton's Essay on the Diaks of Borneo is particularly telling. Many of these islands (Borneo and its environs) were originally stocked from Siam and Comboja by mass migration.

> Megidano [Maguindanao] is one of the first islands in the eastern seas, it contains as many square miles as the largest of the Philippines, and is peopled throughout with an industrious race of men from the shores of Camboja…Likewise with the Sooloo [Sulu] islands, including the northern part of Borneo, and perhaps of the Celebes. This communication yet continues; it is more or less direct, and hundreds of prows annually sail from the continent, to the numerous islands amongs the Sooloo seas, continually pouring into them its superabundant population, which must, perforce, travel westerly. *This is merely a continuation of the former system of emigration, which originally, stocked most of these islands with human beings* [*italics* — mine].[132]

Many enterprising Iranūns made a killing in the business of transporting refugees. A remarkable warrior was Amaloy ā Pakatan امالويآفكاتَن [c. 1520-] {Gadiya Muda}[133] who used the Pulo Ubi فولواوبي and Pulo Condor فولوكُندور to array his *padaw* فادَو (prahus) in staging many of his exploits. His appellation "Young Elephant" (Gadiya Muda غَدياموردا) spoke of his being initiated in elephant warfare as a young man in clashes between

[132] Moor, J. H., *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries;* Mr. Datlon's Essay on the Diaks of Borneo, (Singapore: 1837) Published in the Singapore Chronicle, March & April 1831.

[133]Gadiya is the Iranūn word for elephant. Taken from the Sanskrit Gaja (गज), Gadiya is also the Maranao-Magindanao word for rook in the game of chess (saturan). For an account on the origin of chess in the Philippines, see the author's article "Ghost of the Çáturaṅṅ: Of lost skills, tradition and language", *The Manila Times*, December 27, 2020.

Cambodia and Burma and Ayuthaya. Most of his prime *nakhodas* were drawn from his wife's place, Putrí Bunganipa sa Sōlog (Sulu).[134]

Warriors from Lusung (Luzon) had also participated on various sides of the conflict:

> On the mainland, Lusung warriors aided the Burmese king in his invasion of Siam in 1547 AD. At the same time, Lusung warriors fought alongside the Siamese king and faced the same elephant army of the Burmese king in the defence of the Siamese capital at Ayuthaya.[135]

Contrary to what Filipino scholars have been writing all along, this warlike Lusung warriors cannot be the "gentle" Tagalog that José Rizal had written about which the Spaniards easily subdued and enrolled in their religion. Because the Spaniards had clipped-off their wings, these gentle people would only muster light-tonnage fishing boats who would not venture too far out in the sea, always making sure the coast is always in sight. In contrast, Lusung-based mariners were dyed-in-the-wool Lŭtao-Iranūn country traders who were used to high-sea voyaging, whose reach had gone as far as India, Burma, Sumatra, Papua and even the northern coast of Australia. As exigencies allowed, they doubled as mercenaries, and sometimes they fought either side of the opposing forces. When they could not resist the Spaniards they scattered, resettled in other islands, notably the southwest of Mindoro and other far-out bases in Southeast Asia. In Balayan, the Franciscan friars were shocked to learn that these people they stumbled on still want to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.[136]

Leaders like Sapetu Diraja can only be the Mohamedan Lŭtao-Iranūn. Sapetu Diraja is the nakhoda Saptu Diradya Laut. Sapetu is an Iranūn word for the Arabic Alsabt السبت, meaning Saturday, while Diradaya is a Malaccan title. As a merchant, and seafaring warrior, Sapetu called Luzon trading port his home; he was also related to the nobles of Magindanao. He led his contingent in Burma's fight against Siam (Thailand) in 1547. But at the same time there were many Lŭtao-Iranūn mercenaries who fought for the opposite side with Ayuthia. Many Lŭtao-Iranūn who are based in the Pulo Ubi فولواوبي off the coast of Siam and Cambodia have their own families in Cambodia but at the same time their Orang Laut were married into the royalties of

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[134] *Genealogy ref.*: Gugudan ko Mala ā Bangsa by Baì Macabaì Mangandog; Sempad a Maradika a Paninggalan sa Ranao - Vol. I by Tingcap G. Pandi; Maranao: So Totholanon, Taritib, Ijma, ago Impit a Salsila by Dr. Moh'd Saadudin Talib B. Lomondot)

[135] Scott, William Henry, *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994) page 195.

[136] For a trending reevaluation of Philippine history using good old library research, see the essays in Nakpil, Carmen Guerrero, *Heroes and Villains*, (Makati: Cruz Communications, 2010.

Siam. This is affirmed by Datu Dimasángkay's refusal to take part in Cambodia's fight against Siam, as he reasoned to the embassy sent by the Cambodian king, Magindanao is kin to both opposing kingdoms.

Palawan فَّلَوَن as transit hub for immigrants

In evacuating refugees over the centuries from mainland Southeast Asia using the corridor Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn) ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن (Spratlys) ⇒ Kapuloan (Palawan فَّلَوَن), the last mentioned played the key role in the redistributions. The periodic swell in population pending the deployments is brought about by the intermittent wars in Champā and Cambodia before it again recedes back to its normal level. Sans the business of redeploying immigrants, Palawan فَّلَوَن was a rich source of product which even more made the traffic along the unorthodox route dense.

> …the yearly amount of prows sailing from the same parts to the island of Palawan were not less than eighty of considerable size. Palawan is governed by a rajah related to the Emperor of Cochin-China. Here as well as in Megidano [Magindanao], there are gold and tin mines; and edible bird's nests of the black kind have lately been discovered on the former island. The population of Palawan is even greater than that of Megidano, and the arrival of from seven to ten thousand men annually compel a part to spread themselves over the further islands.[137]

The conquest of the south of present-day Vietnam by the Đại Việt was an arduous one. In 1470, the king Lê Thánh Tông began a full-court press. The next two hundred years was a time of civil war which resulted in the diaspora of the Chams. They spread into the borders with Cambodia but it was at Pulo Condor فولوكُندور that the house of Raja Pandara controlled the whole operation over several generations. Mostly, the Iranūn nakhodas operated the Spratlys route on a sail-now-pay-later scheme.

> One of the principal Chiefs whose territories are situate on the great western Camboja river [Mekong Delta], imposes a tax of five dollars on each emigrant,

[137] Cochin-China here is to mean Central Champā or the Chams themselves. The author was applying a latter term, an exonym employed by the French to the Đại Việts especially to the Nguyen lords. When the author refers to the Emperor of Cochin-China, he meant the Cham King. The giveaway here is the term Rajah, which is used by the Chams who are of Javanese descent, but never by the Nguyen lords (1600-1774); Moor, J. H., Notices, 47.

> which sum is advanced by the anakodah of the prow, and placed with the passage-money to account, to be repaid on finding him a master amongst the islands.[138]

The number of refugees bound for Borneo were profuse also. At least 500 prow sail annually from the coast of Cambodia. Siam, however, forbid outbound refugees and were only interested in trade. The trade of China to the Philippines at this time, did not go as far as Sulu, but stops at Manila, and just a few sails.

[138] *Ibid*, 47

CHAPTER 11 SUMMARY

From among the various contending states on the disputed islands in the South China Sea, China (PRC or mainland China) is the most vocal on "historical" right. China has been all along ignoring the UNCLOS and all the arbitrations made, but instead seemed solely infatuated with its "inviolable sovereign historical right" over the disputed islands. The Nine-Dash Line it presented in 1947 seeks to claim a large swath of the South China Sea as part of the "holy motherland for a stretch of 2,000-years". This, singularly, is the most grotesquely egregious concoction ever foisted on by any claimant to the dispute.

The very outline of the Nine-Dash Line, in fact, denies more than a millennium history of relationship and cultural exchanges between and among island Southeast Asia and mainland Southeast Asia. Its exclusion of the key islands that formed part of the trade and communications network among peoples of Southeast Asia is a glaring demonstration of sheer ignorance — or deliberate ignoring — of key events and happenstances that shaped Southeast Asia as a region across the centuries.

The key off-coast islands in question: Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن (Zhambulao or Cù Lao Chàm), Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn island), and Pulo Ubi فولواوبي (Ubi island).

Generally, most trade route passes through two routes. The coast-hugging west route, which had been most in use for more than a millennium passes round Champā and Cambodia before snaking into various destinations. The other one, the east coast-hugging route, passes north to south of the Philippines to Sulu before breaking into sub-routes.

Traversing across the South China Sea is not popular in olden times because of the inherent danger of ships — let alone flat-bottomed ones — getting marooned. These mentioned off-coast islands offer the key in identifying which mariners had been traversing which islands across the South China Sea between mainland Southeast Asia and island Southeast Asia.

For China to exclude them in its famous Nine-Dash Line is fatal. The "Line" makes a disconnect of the network established by the Iranūn in so far as the Spratly Islands is concerned and the Cham for the Paracel Islands.

Putting late markers on protruding rocks and planting flags are just semaphore symbolism that has no bearing to actual usage. "Seasonal fishing camps and intermittent commercial guano mining do not qualify as occupation, at least not by a state."[139]

If intense activity, use, and prolonged stay are the determinant factors to claim of "historical" ownership of the disputed islands, then only two sets of people are indisputably entitled to them.

The key people involved are the Chams of Champā (now Vietnam) and the Iranūn of the Philippines. Sadly, these people being only hosted by contending modern states, and reduced to ciphers, do not have the wherewithal to claim the islands for themselves. Up to now, they watch on the sidelines as the drama unfolds in the South China Sea.

As for the Cham, their culture and history is being systematically erased by the Vietnamese in official textbooks. Their once magnificent ancient ruins are in poor repair, overran by vegetation and their ethnicity is elided in tourism brochures.

Based on the trade run Zhambulao (Sambulawan سَمبولَوَن) ⇒ Mindoro ⇒ Paracel Island ⇒ Butuan (Mindanao) since the protohistoric period, the Cham — hands down — has an indisputable historical claim on the Paracel Islands, although the Iranūn also partook in the run. When Đại Việt sacked the capital of Inderapura, the northernmost *kampong* كمفوڠ (principality), Cham refugees crossed to Hainan. Others had set up shops in Butuan where they already had an emporium. Whereas Butuan used to be an outlier of Champā, the momentary lull in commerce in the central node of the west route brought by the war presented Butuan an opportunity to send an embassy for the first time to China in 1001. This was earnestly followed by two more embassies lobbying for an upgrade of Butuan to gain equal status with Champā.

Today, Vietnam, instead of invoking Cham's history, it bans any mention of Cham in perpetuity. But, in fact, the maritime Cham holds the key to resolving questions in the South China Sea for the Đại Việt were late entrant in the Southeast Asian networks. "Between the 16th and the 18th centuries, the Đại Việt, ancestor of today's Vietnam, was barely integrated with the Southeast Asian networks. It hardly participated,

[139] Flecker, Michael, "Early Chinese Voyaging in the South China Sea: Implications on Territorial Claims", Journal of Maritime Studies and National Integration, 1 (1), 1-21

therefore, in what historians qualify as the 'Golden age of Commerce in Southeast Asia.' The abundance of pirate ships which used to cruise the high seas off its coasts is certainly one of the main reasons."[140] Now, present Vietnam has put all it eggs in one basket: the first expedition to the Hoang Sa (Paracel) during the time of the Nguyen Lords in the 17th century. This is the basis of what Vietnam solely claims as its historical right simply because it was a Vietnamese initiative. Though very late, and pales in comparison to the indisputable Cham claim, the Vietnamese hold on to this, sink or swim.

As for the Iranūn, they were never made part of a Philippine history obsessed with "nation-building" that only commenced in late 19th century. If mentioned at all, the Iranūn are best tuned-out as "pirates", walk-in characters in the legacy of colonial writings. Yet in fact, the Iranūn is the very key to the Philippines' claim on the Spratly Islands (Sulawan سُلَوَن) and the Scarborugh Shoal (Panakot).

With the Iranūn, the Philippines can claim them multiple ways. In its complex form, the descendants of the Iranūn are scattered in hundreds of islands all over Southeast Asia today, even reaching as remote as Australia, Burma, and India. At its core, it forms the bulkhead of Maranao, Magindanao, and Sulu and Tawi-Tawi polities. In ancient times, the Iranūn have shifting identities borne by the nature of their craft in trading and their maritime raiding adventures. They had come knocking on the doors of China before the latter ventured out into the high-seas. The Iranūn is unfettered by our definition of nation-states. For their prowess in 18th century, they were given the moniker 'Vikings of the East'.

Champā of what is now Vietnam was accessed first from the south by the Austronesians from Tebouk تُبوك of Southern Philippines and East Borneo sometime in the 2nd century CE. They were later joined by the Javanese and the Malay. Later Iranūn from Tebouk تُبوك came for trade or raiding on the coast. As Champā progressed over the centuries, they had a trading with various kingdoms of Southeast Asia, namely Śrīvijaya and Majapahit. Champā had become an entrepôt where ships that ply the coast-hugging western route had to pass by.

Throughout these periods, though not exclusively, the Iranūn, identified as Orang Laut and Rajas, had accessed Champā through an unorthodox secondary route: Palawan فَلَوَن ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن ⇒ Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn) ⇒ Pandara

[140] Eric Frécon, "The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia", Carnets de l'Irasec (Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine, 2018) ISBN 2956447041, 9782956447047

(Pāṇḍuraṅga/Phan Rang) ⇒ Vijaya (Vijayapura). Shipwrecks at Pandanan, Thitu Island in the Spratlys, and other areas are a testament to this route.

Beginning with the Đại Việt (Vietnam) push south at the end of the 10th century, the Iranūn had participated in the wars on the Champā side. Refugees trickled south. But the most telling was the fall of Vijaya in 1471, where the Iranūn at Pāṇḍuraṅga had to ferry outbound refugees to Southeast Asia via their unorthodox route. The naming of the capital of Cebu to Singhapala as a toponym to the royal capital Siṅhapura in Trà Kiệu citadel in Vijaya (Vijayapura) is a testament to the exodus that ensued. This is also how we got the name Bisaya in memory of the Cham capital Vijaya (the same with Visayans who landed in north Borneo). This is the Chinghapola settlement of Cebu mentioned by the Italian chronicler Antonio Pigafetta of the Magellan Expedition in 1521.

Palawan فَلَوَن became a transit hub for immigrants bound to various points of Borneo, Sulawesi, Visayas, Mindanao, Sulu, and other places. Palawan فَلَوَن is clearly marked in red in the *Carta Indigena Filipina* now housed at Madrid's *Museo Naval*. This indicates that Palawan فَلَوَن is one of the bailiwicks of the Iranūn. The *Carta Indigena Filipina* is the only indigenous Filipino map ever existing today.

The map is an Iranūn-Ugi Portulan donated to the Madrid's *Museo Naval* in 1847 under España Ministerio de Defensa AMN-58-16. It is formally designated by the curators of the *Museo* as "Carta Indigena Filipina". The map was contained inside a bamboo tube taken from the breastwork of a "Moro pirate" ship captured near the waters of the Sulu archipelago. Unlike the Murillo map, the Iranūn chart was drafted in ink on cowhide, with highlights in various colors. The northern limit is about 17° or 18°N latitude, so they include much of mainland Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Obviously, it was essayed to contain the unorthodox routes the Iranūn take in their trading and raiding, taking note of their forward bases, their haunts, and settlements represented by the profusion of dots on the chart. It is more revealing than the 1734 "Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Islas Filipinas" published by the Jesuit Pedro Murillo as the portulan depicts the South China Sea in its gore and glory. Had the Moro *Carta* been considered in formulating the 1898 Treaty of Paris in tandem with a consultation of knowledgeable personalities like Hārūn al-Rashīd Amīr al-Mu'minīn {Sultan of Sulu} [r. 1886-1894] who was still alive and exiled in Palawan فَلَوَن at the time [d. 1899], he would have for sure injected the Spratly Islands into the equation. As it turned out, no Filipino were allowed to even witness or take part in the formulation of the treaty.

Contrary to Maspero's reconstruction of Champā history leading up to the invasion of 1471, whose view was upheld by George Coedès's classic study of the "Hinduized

states of Southeast Asia", the ethnicity of Champā was never predominantly Cham. Through all the centuries of Champā's existence, the Malay, the Bugis, the Iranūn, and other island Southeast Asians had been, more or less, involved themselves as traders, mercenaries, and courtiers to succeeding generations of rulers. Champā had been a loose confederations of sorts, whose composition was continually being redefined. It was not as monolithic as early scholars had contended. But the least appreciated or rather most obscured is the Iranūn's participation.

Champā did not end abruptly after the fall of Vijaya (Vijayapura) in 1471, as Maspero would have us believe. The Ming Dynasty continued to receive envoys from, and grant investiture to, Cham rulers through the 1540s. The flow of refugees to the south was heavy though and the flight of Cham across the South China Sea unrestrained. The Iranūn had especially been heavily engaged when the capital shifted to Pāṇḍuraṅga (the modern provinces of Bình Thuận and Ninh Thuận) where they have built communities there while maintaining trade and communications networks. In fact, one can even point that at Pāṇḍuraṅga was the Iranūn's golden age in mainland Southeast Asia.

The great exodus of the Cham people to different points of Southeast Asia was poorly documented so there is not much literature on it. But some snippets of the royal refugees are found in Malay scripts.

Around near the end of the 16th century, the trader Radyâ sa Pulo Condor فولوكُندور had more or less permanently established a trading base in Pāṇḍuraṅga in joint venture with Iranūn nakhodas based in Mindoro for their overseas trade. The main village was called Campong Kerbu. They were given a free lease of the main island provided they control the piracy around the area.

Pulo Condor فولوكُندور is vital to the Philippines' claim on the Spratlys because it is intrinsic to the Iranūn's activity in the South China Sea then. To them Pulo Condor فولوكُندور is an inextricable node of their network that connects mainland Southeast Asia to Borneo, the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia.

In numerous *salsilah* of the Maranao-Iranūn *kirim* scripts, the key figure here is the Iranūn-Bugis Princess Mabay sa Condor. She is invariably referred to in Teluk Illana as 'Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور' (باءِ ساكوندور). The Champā principalities (kampong كمفوڠ) that ran north to south of the spine of what is now modern Vietnam had gradually over the centuries "became unified through a complex system of kinship and marital alliances. As speakers of an Austronesian language, the Cham were entirely distinct from their Vietnamese neighbors on the eastern littoral of mainland Southeast Asia." The process found its apogee at Pāṇḍuraṅga when yet for another push south, the Đại

Việt were able to unseat Champā at its central capital in Vijaya forcing it to move its capital to the south.

Considering that, even after the fall of Vijaya the Cham retreated to the southernmost kampong كمفوڠ of Pāṇḍuraṅga to wage their stand. And through the ensuing decades until late in the 17th century, the flow of migrants into other islands of Southeast Asia was unabated. It was this infusion of population that strengthened the polities of the islands in the Philippines before the Europeans came.

In 1692 a second wave of great migration occurred after a great Vietnamese victory. About five thousand families led by the royal family asked for protection from the Khmer king Jayajettha III (1677–1709) who settled them in the capital Qudong, and various places. However, the house of Raja Pandara along with their *urubarang* chose to migrate across the sea to Tebouk تٟبوك, southwest of Mindanao, while still others paid for their flight to other points of island Southeast Asia.

The 'boat people' retracing the old Iranūn route relived ancient history to confirm the route of the Iranūn at the South China Sea. In the 1970s through the 1990s, the Philippines grudgingly welcomed these mostly Vietnamese and Chinese refugees that never go beyond an obligation of fulfilling a quota under the spirit of universal humanitarian aid. The Malay were more subtle though in choosing who to admit in their ranks by allowing ethnic Chams (mostly Bani Cham Muslims), embracing them with the accolade of a long lost kinsman (*sesama rumpun*). The glaring difference in the attitude towards this people is so because the Malay keep their *hikayat* so they more or less know their ancient connections while Filipinos generally are blissfully unaware of their ancestors' provenance. Little do they know as they allowed these 'boat people' in their fold that they were the last batch of exodus from Champā into their archipelago (albeit a gap of no less than five centuries from the last one!). This earlier migration allowed the sparsely populated islands to gain the much needed density of population — a key component to later nationhood.

Tamat.

APPENDIX

Questions and Answers

Questions formulated by Dean Bernal, CEO & Founder, Uniquecorn Strategies Inc., Blockceler8; Answered by the author:

Q. *What led to the decision by the 16 sultans representing the Iranūn to formally declare ownership of these disputed territories as patrimony from their ancestors?*

A. Through the initiative of the Tomas Cabili Foundation, the descendants of the Iranūn feel an urgency **to provide provenance** of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoals through their historical experience **to *strengthen* Philippines' claim** on the disputed territories in the South China Sea.
China is especially vocal on its so-called 'sovereign historical rights' over the disputed islets as part of the 'holy motherland.' **China suspects, however wrongly, that the Philippines would not be able to provide its own historical angle to the disputed islets**. For instance, Xu Xiaodong wrote in China Daily that "The Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands stayed beyond the attention of the Spanish colonial empire" He further declares that "…a review of history shows that the Philippines has no historical basis for its claim to the Spratly Islands…"

Answer expanded:
What the Chinese failed to take into account or do not know is that despite the colonial presence of the Spanish in the Philippines since the 16th century, **the so-called "Moro" were business as usual. Their polity was way beyond the pale of the Spanish government. And even centuries before, nay even a millennium or so, the Iranūn were traversing the South China Sea, then called *Laut Champā* in their dealings with mainland Southeast Asia.** Thankfully, the Chinese are reading Philippine history textbooks which dwell mainly on 'nation- building' of the late 19th century and the administrations of the Spaniards, which led to their wrong conclusion.

China has decided that historical basis is the Achilles' heel of Philippines' claim on the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoals. That is why they use it as a battering ram to undo whatever progress had been gained at the United Nations. They sense that we are wanting in this sphere that we solely dwell on the scaffolds of the UNCLOS (United Nations Conventions on the Sea).

With the declaration of the descendants of the Iranūn, **now China knows who the true heirs of Sulawan سُلَوَن and Panakot**. These are the Iranūn names of Spratlys and Scarborough Shoals, respectively.

Q. *On Marcos Jr's recent SONA, he missed discussing the issues on the West PH Sea. What do you think is the impact of your declaration in relation to the government's supposed diplomatic action?*

A. It was wise for the President to sidestep the West Philippine Sea issue or **he runs the risk of overwhelming the SONA** with it. The President will have another platform for a chance to discuss the West Philippine Sea. The 'declaration' made by the Iranūn descendants gives the Philippines a much needed **justification and leverage if ever it wants to negotiate with China on a one-on-one basis** sans the participation of a third party.

Answer expanded:
We have to remember that China drew its Nine-Dashed Line in a perforated line instead of a solid one. This is a signal that China is open to a negotiation with claimants like the Philippines.

Q. *Could you elaborate on the role of Sultan Tomas Reyes Cabili, Jr., and the TLC Foundation in spearheading this movement?*

A. The TLC Foundation and its partners are now **focused on disseminating** Philippines' historical provenance on the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals. Its key partner, the *PMTC Institute of Iranūn Studies* based in Marawi City **provides most of the original materials** for the provenance with its access to *salsilahs* (genealogies), *kirim* chronicles of the Iranūn, along with international researches in Southeast Asia.

Answer expanded:
At the Foundation, our advocacy is pursuing the legacy of the late Senator Tomas Cabili. We have to be reminded that **Cabili was the only delegate** to the 1935 Constitutional convention who did not signed the final draft of the constitution, and it was passed without his blessing. Cabili felt that his people, the Moro— the Iranūn— had been short-changed. Cabili was all too aware that the transition to independence happening throughout Southeast Asia at the end of World War II **meant the sealing of national frontiers, and the boxing-in of his people within defined borders**, which made them give up the flexibility they and their forebears used to take for granted. Now his warnings haunts us today in the shape of the South China Sea issue.

Q. *How did the collaboration with the PMTC Institute of Iranūn Studies and the Southeast Asian Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry come about in this endeavor?*

A. It turned out that the three organizations have a common advocacy in the **need to expand Philippine history and the need to correct its perspective**. As it stands now, Philippine history is being decoded according to the precepts of the legacies

of our colonial experience, that, to paraphrase Jacob van Leur, it is being written from the deck of a Galleon ship.
And China is just all too happy that we embrace this. Our institutions, over the century, have accumulated piles and piles of academic papers, researches, and anthropological studies that is rendered useless and irrelevant against the onslaught of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The Chinese gloats on our quandary.

Q. *What solid historical evidence or narratives were presented during the assembly at the NMS Convention Center in Marawi City to support the claim of ownership?*

A. The solid evidence and narratives that we present are the ***salsilahs*** **(genealogies), the *kirim* manuscripts of the Iranūn, oral literature and histories, chronicles and dirges and deep field researches in the *nusantara* (Southeast Asia), especially in Mindanao, Sulu, Borneo, Sulawesi, and Maluku**.

Q. In your statement, you mentioned the need to provide the Philippines with "timely ammunition" on the sovereign claim of these territories. Could you explain what you mean by that and how it might impact the current dispute in the South China Sea?

A. The historical perspective that we present in the monograph *Iranūn and Philippines' Historical Claim in the South China Sea: the binding tie of place, meaning, and memory* came in the neck of time when events at the South China Sea are coming to a head. Not a day passes without a near hair-brush encounter between the superpowers, and the US starts to entrench itself in many key bases within Philippines itself. **We hope that in our own way, we can calm down the protagonists by invoking a sensible discussions on the claims. This is the impact we are aiming at**.

Q. *How do you see this patrimony claim complementing or strengthening the theoretical frameworks already presented in the United Nations?*

A. The patrimony claim is not meant as a substitute to the frameworks already obtained at the United Nations. **Without abandoning what has already been accomplished by the Philippines so far, the historical claim farther buttresses our right on the Spratlys and the Scarborough shoals**.

Q. *How do you plan to address the official nomenclature of the Philippine government, which categorizes the Iranūn as just a sub-group between Lanao and Maguindanao?*

A. The nomenclature of the Philippines on the Iranūn as a tribe sandwiched between Lanao and Maguindanao had misled historians into thinking that they were just the Iranūns. **The Philippine agencies concerned must do an actual field study on what comprises the Iranūn**. There dominant tribe in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and

Basilan بَسيلَن are Iranūn as well. There are sizeable population of Iranūns around different regions in Borneo today. And in Riau Indonesia we have millions of Iranūn which are sadly classified as Orang-Laut. Rather than arbitrary designations, we need to have an actual survey.

Q. *The monograph "The Iranūn and Philippines' Claim in the South China Sea" brought up a unique indigenous Filipino map, the Carta Indigena Filipina. How does this map differ from other historical maps used in laying claim to the disputed islands?*

A. The Velarde map of 1734 that included Panakot (name used for Scarborough) is touted as the mother of all Philippine maps. It was authored by the Jesuit priest Murillo Velarde, who based on the naming convention on the map had made use of Mohammedan information as the Jesuit priests were frequent guests in the court of the royalties. Ironically, the Carta Indigena Filipina housed in the Museo de Madrid, the only indigenous Filipino map (portulan) found in the breastwork of a "Moro pirate" ship never figured in laying claim on Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals. A further irony is that the Carta Indigena Filipina stands out as it features the expanse of the South China Sea in its gore and glory. The Iranūn's bailiwicks and forwarded bases like Palawan فَلَوَن are delineated in red outlines. I think there is an inherent prejudice against the Moro in reckoning Philippine history, and as we just said, China likes this attitude as it suppresses relevant history on the disputed territories.

Had the Moro *Carta* been considered in formulating the 1898 Treaty of Paris in tandem with a consultation of knowledgeable personalities like Hārūn al-Rashīd Amīr al-Mu'minīn {Sultan of Sulu} [r. 1886-1894] who was still alive and exiled in Palawan فَلَوَن at the time [d. 1899], he would have for sure injected the Spratly Islands into the equation. As it turned out, no Filipino were allowed to even witness or take part in the formulation of the treaty.

Q. *In the press release, there's mention of historical activity by the Iranūn Orang Laut and their Rajas in the disputed islets. Could you provide more details about their historical use and occupation of these areas?*

A. In terms of trade, the normal route is the west coast-hugging route round Champā, Cambodia, Siam, and then across to the Malay Peninsula. This is the traditional trade route.
However, to access mainland Southeast Asia in its trade route especially Champā, the Iranūn from Tebouk تُبوك (Mindanao) took their springy *padau* (prahu) boats to Champā via the route Palawan فَلَوَن ⇒ Sulawan سُلَوَن (Spratlys) ⇒ Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Côn Sơn) ⇒Pāṇḍuraṅga ⇒Vijaya. This unorthodox route is exclusive to the intrepid Iranūn and had been in place since the 3rd century to 6th century.
This is also the route they take in their raiding expeditions on the mainland characteristic of the Austronesian mariners who rove the South China Sea of the pre-modern world.
And this also the route they used to ferry refugees from Champā and Cambodia over the centuries from the 10th century until late 17th century. Thus, the Spratlys as a

relay is being used by the Iranūn in an extraodinary manner as opposed to the seasonal fishing camps and intermittent guano mining activities of China that do not qualify as occupation, at least not by a state.

Q. *What do you hope to achieve with this patrimony claim, and how do you see it shaping the future discourse and resolution of the South China Sea dispute?*

A. With the patrimony claim, from now on the issue on the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoals takes a narrative turn for the Philippines and for all the claimant countries.

Whereas the Philippines can claim the disputed islets in the name of the Iranūn, Vietnam could not and would not claim them on behalf of the Cham, because the Đại Việts were not the original polities (kampong كمفوڠ) of Champā, which had been renamed Vietnam. Over the centuries, they usurped domino-fashion all the principalities of Champā over the centuries ending up at Pāṇḍuraṅga, the last bastion.

Instead today's government in Vietnam, which is trying erase Cham culture and history, is invoking its first expedition to the Hoang Sa (Paracel) during the time of the Nguyen Lords in the 17th century. This is the basis of what Vietnam solely claims as its historical right.

But this period was already late in history reckoning. As for the Philippines, it behooves on it to pursue the development of Cham as a civilization and follow it to its eventual demise as it unlocks all the historical justification on its claim on the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal.

Declaration of Provenance of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal

by the Descendants of the Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور and Anta sa Têbouk,
16 Royal Houses of Lanao, and the 28 Legislative Assembly,
Federation of the Royal Sultanate of Lanao, Marawi Sultanate League

WHEREAS, the Iranūn, our ancestors, who came from the Têbouk region of the Philippines, better known to them as the *Batalō Pagilīdan*, all outstanding navigators in their day, had been one of the earliest Austronesians who plied the highs seas of the Champā Sea, now called the South China Sea, since as early as the 3rd century;

WHEREAS, the Iranūn were the earliest navigators that made use of Sulawan سُلَوَن (now called the Spratly Islands) and the Scarborough Shoals in a meaningful manner for trade route to mainland Southeast Asia, for marine adventure and raiding, and in transporting refugees and emigrants from mainland Southeast Asia brought by the intermittent wars between and among the the Đại Việt, the Chams and the Khmers from the 10th century until the 18th century, which distributed to various regions of insular Southeast Asia;

WHEREAS, historical experiences of occupancy in the South China Sea lays not in putting markers or planting flags which are just semaphore symbolism that has no bearing to actual usage, and that seasonal fishing camps and intermittent commercial guano mining do not qualify as occupation by a state;

WHEREAS, the Nine-Dashed Line of China in 1947, naively excluded Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Con Son Dau), an island off the southern coast of Cham (now Vietnam) and Cambodia. That while China went so far as to insinuate its Nine-Dashed Line to the coast of Palawan فَلَوَن, the exclusion of Pulo Condor فولوكُندور in the "Line" makes a fatal disconnect of the network established by the Iranūn in so far as the Spratly Islands is concerned;

WHEREAS, the descendants of the Iranūn and the last Princess Ḅaì sa Condor باءِ ساكوندور, known as Mabay sa Condor or Wulanḅaì sa Têbouk mostly reside in the Philippines today. Whereas the *salsilahs* (genealogies) that track their unfurling over the

centuries had been faithfully kept by their elders in their *kirim* scripts and their histories and in their oral tradition and reminiscences;

NOW THEREFORE, we the descendants do hereby declare the provenance of the Spartlys Island (Sulawan سُلَوَن) and the Scarborough Shoal (Panakot) as belonging to the bailiwick of the Iranūn through their constant usage and control of the islands concerned over the centuries, and that the said islands had been bequeathed to us by our ancestors through the natural process of inheritance.

We have hereunto affixed our signatures to this deed executed on the 19th July, 2023 in the Islamic City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur, Philippines.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Bullet Points for Presentation

Here is the gist of Philippines' historical claim on the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoals in the South China Sea.

- Since the 3rd century the Austronesian Iranūn from Tebouk ثْبوك in Mindanao had been using the route Tebouk ثْبوك (Southwest Mindanao) ↔ Palawan فَلَوَن ↔ Sulawan سُلَوَن(Spratlys) ↔ Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (now Con Son) ↔ Pāṇḍuraṅga (PhanRang) to reach mainland Southeast Asia.
- Over the centuries the Iranūn exclusively uses this route to trade, raid and reach various points of mainland Southeast Asia; the normal trade route was the western coast-hugging route round Champā and Cambodia well away and giving a wide berth of the Spratly Islands;
- China's commercial shipping started late than many other countries. In the 7th century China shipping were limited to small craft plying along its coast, manned by Sinicized Yueh. The Chinese, because of her lack of a naval power, was not taking active role in the Asian trade, contenting itself to deal at its own domestic ports;
- Most of the shipping were manned by Austronesian-speakers. Not until the 12th century did Chinese take a significant role themselves in the trade, and only in the 16th century did they become dominant in it at the expense of the island South East Asians;
- In the centuries of intermittent wars between among Đại Việt (North Vietnam) and the Champā kingdoms, the Iranūn used their Spratlys (Sulawan سُلَوَن) route to ferry refugees and immigrants from Champā (now Vietnam) and eventually distribute them to various regions of island Southeast Asia well until the 18th century;
- The 1947 Nine Dashed Line of the Chinese, by excluding Pulo Condor فولوكُندور (Con Son Island) in it, makes a naive disconnect of the network of the Iranūn, and shows ignorance of the happenstances surrounding the Champā Sea (later renamed South China Sea by the Portuguese) over the centuries;
- The descendants of the princess Bai sa Condor are the true heirs of the Spratlys through their Iranūn ancestors' constant usage of the Spratlys over the centuries;
- The Zeng He expeditions (1405-1433) and the Mongol Yuan expedition (1293) never touched on Spratlys, and both used the traditional roundabout coast-hugging route of the west trade route;
- The old capital of Cebu Sanghapala is a toponym of Siṅhapura (Tra Kieu) of Vijaya. It is not true that the Bisaya took their name from the Sri Vijaya Empire of Sumatra but from central Vijaya in Champā. Their ancestors were the immigrant refugees who took the Spratlys route courtesy of Iranūn steerage; Siṅhapura in Trà Kiệu citadel in Vijaya (Vijayapura) is a testament to the exodus that had ensued. This is also how we got the name Bisaya in memory of the Cham capital Vijaya (the same with Visayans who landed in north Borneo);
- Seasonal fishing camps and intermittent commercial guano mining do not qualify as occupation, at least not by a state. Neither does putting late markers on protruding rocks which are just semaphore symbolism and has no bearing to actual usage as did the Iranūn to count for ownership;
- Today we have hundreds of thousands of descendants of the Bai sa Condor and Anta sa Tebouk ثْبوك answering to the claims on Sulawan سُلَوَن (Spratlys) and Panakot (Scarborough Shoal) as their patrimony from their Iranūn ancestors.